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Vll l 
Michael Jensen, M.D., respectfully submits his Corrected Brief of Appellee/Cross-
Appellant's Brief. The statement of jurisdiction, the issues presented for review, the applicable 
constitutional rules, statutes, etc. and statements of the case are combined. Only the argument 
responding to the Appellants' brief and the cross-appeal argument are separately identified. 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a judgment entered after a jury verdict 
and the cross-appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A Whether the judgment should be affirmed on: (1) whether the Media Defendants' 
broadcasts focused only on Dr. Jensen's professional duties; (2) whether the statements were 
substantially true; (3) whether Dr. Jensen sustained economic damages; and (4) whether there 
was clear and convincing evidence of malice; each requiring a marshaling of the evidence and 
a demonstration of insufficiency. Crvokstonv Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
B. Whether this Court should review a pretrial denial of summary judgment after an 
adverse trial judgment. This is an issue of law and inherently can only be raised in this Court. 
C Whether the district court correctly declined to apply the defamation one-year statute 
of limitations to false light invasion of privacy claims. The Appellants identified where this issue 
was presented below. This is an issue of law determined by Ccoc v Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 
1988), which ruled that defamation and invasion of privacy are separate and distinct torts 
affecting separate and different interests. 
D. Whether a physician has a reasonable expectation of privacy not to be secretly 
videotaped in his examination room when all of the physicians who testified on the subject said 
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that Dr. Jensen should have an expectation of privacy. This issue was raised in & 2741; 2951-
64; 5701; 5720-24; 5968 and 6042-50. This is an issue of fact resolved by the jury Crxxkston v 
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
E. Whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the Media Defendants' false posing 
as a patient, installing a hidden video camera in the doctor's examination room, and using 
selected tape bites to deceptively portray a physician as one offering illegal drugs and comparing 
this to physicians who rape or kill their patients, was highly offensive. This issue was preserved 
by the Special Verdict. The trial court makes the threshold determination of offensiveness 
followed by the jury resolving the question of fact. The verdict is not overturned if there is 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict. SeeStienvMarriot Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1997). 
F. Whether Media Defendants trespassed and intended to subject Dr. Jensen to 
eavesdropping or surveillance under § 76-9-402(1)(a), when the reporter falsely represented 
herself as "a patient needing to lose weight to keep her job" and took a hidden camera into the 
examination room to do a prescripted story? ("Story idea", App. 1) This issue is created by the 
verdict. Whether a trespass occurred is a factual issue. Steelev Breinhdt, 747 P.2d 433 (Utah Q. 
App. 1987). A challenge requires a marshaling of evidence and demonstration of insufficiency. 
Crxxkston v Fire. Ins. Exch.y 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
G. Whether the Media Defendants installed "any device for... recording" when without 
anyone's consent, they installed a hidden videotape camera in Dr. Jensen's examination room? 
UCA Section 76-9-402 suggests this is a question of fact. 
H. Whether any of the Media Defendants' broadcasts placed Dr. Jensen in a false light? 
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This issue is created by the juiy s verdict. A challenge requires a marshaling of evidence and a 
demonstration of insufficiency. Crvokstonv Fire Ins. Exd).y 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
I. Whether a reasonable jury could find that the media's three Dr. Jensen stories were 
each false? This issue was preserved by the Special Verdict and is a factual question requiring 
the Appellant to marshal the evidence and demonstrate insufficiency. See Cvookston v Fire Ins. 
Exd>., 817 P.2d 789,799 (Utah 1991). 
J. Whether a reasonable jury could find that Dr. Jensen suffered economic loss caused 
by the Media Defendants' three stories? This is a factual jury issue not to be set aside unless a 
marshaling of the evidence and demonstration of insufficiency clearly shows the jury's finding 
was erroneous. SeeMassonv New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Fitz v Synthes (USA) 
1999 UT103,990 P.2d 391; Crvokstonv Fire Ins. Exdo., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
K. Whether a reasonable jury could find malice, warranting punitive damages? This issue 
was preserved by the Special Verdict. Whether malice exists is a jury question reviewable under 
the clearly erroneous standard. See Nash v Craigjo, Inc., 585 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1978). 
L. Whether the jury's awards on the common-law intrusion was an invasion of privacy 
claim and whether, the § 76-9-402(1) (a) claim and the § 76-9-402(1) (b) claim were duplicative 
warranting a two-thirds reduction? This issue was raised by the Appellant's Motion for New 
Trial and to Alter or Amend the Judgment [K 5960], and is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. SeeSteenUik v Luhfidd, 906 P.2d 872, 881 (Utah 1995). 
M. Whether the misconduct in gathering information claims relate to the misconduct in 
broadcasting information claims so that Dr. Jensen should be awarded an attorney's fee incurred 
for all of his claims? This issue was raised in the motion for attorney's fees proceedings [R. 
3 
6872]. The iss ue of whether attorney s fees should be awarded on a particular claim is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness. SeeKathJor^nsenSylnc. v OgknCityMallCay 2001 UTApp 128, 
111. 
N. Whether Dr. Jensen should have been awarded "necessary disbursements" for expert 
witness fees, out-of-pocket costs and deposition transcripts? This issue was raised in a motion 
to enter a judgment for costs and necessary disbursements. [R 6215.] It requires an 
interpretation of Rule 54, which is reviewed for correctness. See Carrier v Pro TechRestomtion, 944 
P.2d 346 (Utah 1997). 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC 
In addition to the Media Defendants' citations, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-403 and 76-9-
406, Rule 54(d) Utah Rules of Civ. Proa; Utah Const. Art. VIII Section 4; Utah Administrative 
Code R 156-37-3 are determinative. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case -- Course of Proceedings -- Lower Court Disposition 
United Television Inc. ("KTVX") and its former reporter Mary Sawyers (collectively 
referred to as "Media Defendants") appealed a Judgment entered by Judge Ray Harding, Jr. in 
the 4th Judicial District, Civil No. 970400512CV, after a month-long trial with a jury verdict in 
favor of Dr. Jensen on his defamation, invasion of privacy and intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations claims. The jury also awarded punitive damages. 
Dr. Jensen is cross-appealing a reduction of a portion of the verdict as duplicative; a 
denial of attorney s fees incurred on defamation and false light claims and for work performed 
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by attorney Wesley Sine; and a denial of necessary disbursements as costs.1 
B. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review. 
1. Dispositive Facts 
a. Prior to the three broadcasts at issue2, Dr. Jensen was a general practitioner practicing 
at FirstMed Clinic and also at the Springville Utah Family Clinic. He has since been reduced to 
practicing medicine in nursing homes.3 At no time did the Media Defendants contend that Dr. 
Jensen was a public official or public figure. 
b. United Television owned and operated Channel 4, KTVX. Mary Sawyers ("Ms. 
Sawyers") was a KTVX reporter. [K 6864 (Sawyers) at 109; R. 6861 (Kimball) at 13.] 
c. After a month-long trial, 112 exhibits, and 39 witnesses, the jury entered a verdict in 
Dr. Jensen's favor on his defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations claims. 
d. By use of a special verdict, the jury found that a Nov. 6,1996 broadcast defamed Dr. 
Jensen or placed him in a false light. The Media Defendants did not marshal the evidence 
supporting the jury verdict. Dr. Jensen does not intend to take on their burden, but lists some 
of the facts supporting the verdict: Ms. Sawyers falsely stated: "Dr. Michael Jensen - He's the 
one we caught on tape promising me illegal drugs." [PL's Ex. 21.] What Dr. Jensen said was "if 
Fastin didn't work for you, I would be willing to work with you uh mxjbe using Dexedrine." 
*Dr. Jensen is aware that expert witness fees are almost always not taxed as costs, but 
believes that this case presents an ideal situation for modifying or reversing the existing law. 
2The trial exhibit tape of the three broadcasts is attached as App. 2. 
3In the pecking order of medical practice, practicing in nursing homes is the least 
desirable. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 102.] 
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[Def.'s Ex. 99 at 2 (emphasis added).] Prior to any broadcast, he also corrected himself. He said 
he had done some additional research and could not now prescribe Dexedrine for weight loss. 
The Media Defendants' witness, Dr. Van Komen, testified that Dexedrine is not an illegal drug. 
[R 6857 (Van Komen) at 145.] The story also represented that Dr. Jensen passed out drugs to 
addicts and killed a patient. [PL's Ex. 21.] It placed Dr. Jensen in the same false light categories 
as physicians who perform illegal abortions, disfigure patients, pass out drugs to drug addicts, 
sexually abuse patients, and kill patients with lethal injections. [PL's Ex. 21.] 
e. The jury awarded pecuniary losses of $1 million and general damages of $500,000. 
The Media Defendants did not marshal the evidence. Some supportive facts are: Economist 
Dr. Frank Stuart testified that Dr. Jensen's pecuniarylosses were $1,595,783.00 to $2,195,094.00. 
[R. 6850 (Stuart) at 69 &Pl.'s Ex. 210.] CPADean Smith testified that Dr. Jensen's pecuniaiy 
losses were $1,022,600.00 to $2,179,800.00. [K 6850 (Smith) at 175 &Pl/s Ex. 211.] Dr. Jensen 
testified that he was emotionally damaged. [R 6866 Qensen) at 118-19.] He stated he felt like 
"the rotten egg." He testified he was treated differently by his patients. A patient left after 
learning Dr. Jensen was the treating physician. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 42-45.] Dr. Jensen testified 
he was ridiculed. A pharmacist refused to fill a prescription because he thought that Dr. Jensen 
had lost his medical license. [K 6856 Qensen) at 28.] He can no longer work in a family 
practice. Hospital privileges have been permanently lost. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 28-29 and & 
6866 (Jensen) at 63-66.] Dr. Rosen testified that after the November 6, 1996 broadcast, Dr. 
Jensen was distraught and hurt. [K 6848 (Rosen) at 90-91.] 
f. The jury also found the Media Defendants' September 5, 1995 and June 17, 1996 
broadcasts placed Dr. Jensen in a false light, and awarded $600,000 in pecuniary loss, and 
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$100,000 in general damages. Again, the Media Defendants have failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting this portion of the verdict. Some of the supporting fact areas follow: 1) Dr. Frank 
Stuart testified that Dr. Jensen's pecuniary losses were $1,595,783.00 to $2,195,094.00. [R 6850 
(Stuart) at 56-57, 69 & PL's Exs. 209 & 210.]; 2) Dean Smith, CPA, testified that Dr. Jensen's 
pecuniary losses were $1,022,600.00 to $2,179,800.00. [R 6850 (Smith) at 172,175 &Pl.'s Ex. 
211.]; and 3) Dr. Jensen testified that he was mentally hurt after the first two broadcasts. [K 
6866 (Jensen) at 118-19.] Dr. Jensen testified he was fired the day after the first broadcast and 
intensely investigated for eight months which gready disrupted his life. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 27.] 
Dr. Jensen testified he still suffers ridicule from the two broadcasts. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 28.] 
Dr. Jensen testified that he was removed from IHC insurance privileges, and he can no longer 
work in a family practice. His hospital privileges have been taken away. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 28-
29 and R 6866 (Jensen) at 63-66.] 
g. The jury also found an intrusion upon Dr. Jensen's seclusion and awarded general 
damages of $50,000. Some supporting facts are: Dr. Jensen testified the Media Defendants 
entered into his examination room with a hidden camera. [K 6866 (Jensen) at 55.] Dr. Rosen 
testified that the examination room is a "private place" for physicians. [R 6848 (Rosen) at 89.] 
Dr. Badger testified that he would not allow a hidden camera in an examination room because 
it invades a physician's privacy. [K 6869 (Badger) at 21.] Dr. Purser and Dr. Canfield each 
testified that the examination room is a private place for physicians. [R 6869 (Purser) at 127; 
R 6869 (Ginfield) at 181-82.] Physicians also testified that secret videotaping in an examination 
room was highly offensive. [K 6869 (Canfield) at 181.] 
h. The jury found that KTVX violated § 76-9-402(1) (a), which prohibits anyone from 
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trespassing4 with the intent to subjea anyone to eavesdropping or surveillance in a private place, 
and awarded general damages of $50,000. The Media Defendants did not marshal the facts. 
Some facts supporting the verdict are: The video showed the jurors how Ms. Sawyers falsely 
posed as a patient and recorded her trespass into the examination room. [PL's Ex. 33.] AH 
physicians who testified on the subjea said the examination room is a private place for 
physicians. Sa?para. g above. Ms. Sawyers testified that she did not receive permission to video 
Dr. Jensen or use a hidden camera. [R 6871 (Sawyers) at 57.] 
i. Next, the jury found that the Media Defendants violated § 76-9-402(l)(b), which 
prohibits the installation of any device for observing, photographing, or recording, without 
consent. Some facts supporting the verdict are: The video showed how Ms. Sawyers falsely 
posed as a patient and recorded her visit in Dr. Jensen's examination room without permission. 
The video shows how Ms. Sawyers concealed her hidden camera in a day planner and installed 
it in the examination room. [PL's Ex. 33.] Both Ms. Sawyers and Dr. Jensen testified that he 
did not consent to the secret videotaping. [R 6871 (Sawyers) at 57.] 
j . The jury found that the Media Defendants interfered with Dr. Jensen's prospective 
economic relations and awarded $25,000 in general damages. Some facts supporting the verdict 
are: Dr. Jensen testified he is treated differently by his patients. [R 6866 (Jensen) at 42-45.] He 
testified he cannot work in a family practice because without IHC coverage, most patients will 
not see him. His hospital privileges were taken away. [R 6856 (Jensen) at 28-29 and R 6866 
(Jensen) at 63-66.] Dr. Jensen has been reduced to seeing patients in nursing homes, the last 
4If consent to come on the premises is falsely induced, a trespass occurs. See State v. 
Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
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place a physician would want to work [K 6866 Qensen) at 102.] 
k The jury also found that the Media Defendants' misconduct justified an award of 
punitive damages in conformity with § 78-18-1 etseq. The Media Defendants do not marshal 
the evidence. Some supporting facts are identified in para. "1" below. 
1. The jury awarded punitive damages of $450,600 stemming from the November 6,1996 
broadcast; $245,300 from the September 5th and June 17th broadcasts; $40,000 in punitive 
damages on the common law intrusion claim, and $40,000 each on the two statutory privacy 
violations of §§ 76-9-402(1)(a) and 76-9-402(1)(b). Finally, the jury awarded $25,000 for 
KTVX's intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Some supporting facts 
are: [t]he Media Defendants always intended to do a sensational story ("Story idea," App. 1); Ms. 
Sawyers repeatedly and falsely posed as a patient needing diet drugs to keep her job. She 
repeatedly tried to persuade Dr. Jensen to prescribe drugs over the phone knowing it was 
wrongful.5 During the first broadcast Ms. Sawyers states that Dr. Jensen never asked if she had 
high blood pressure or diabetes. However, Dr. Jensen's assistant took Ms. Sawyers blood 
pressure, and Dr. Jensen had Ms. Sawyer's blood pressure test results at the time he gave Ms. 
Sawyers the prescription. [R 6865 Qensen) at 125-26; & 6866 (Jensen) at 56.] Dr. Jensen 
testified he asked Ms. Sawyers if she had diabetes. [K 6866 0ensen) at 56.] Further, diabetes 
is not a contraindication to taking diet pills. [R. 6866 Qensen) at 56.] Ms. Sawyers fakely 
reported that Dr. Jensen promised her Dexedrine an illegal drug, but Dr. Jensen said "maybe" 
and, before any broadcast, later explained that when he said Dexedrine was technically illegal to 
use as a diet pill, he meant that the rules and regulations discouraged using a Schedule II 
5Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii). 
9 
substance. Consequendy, he informed Ms. Sawyers that he would not prescribe Dexedrine. [& 
6865-6866 (Jensen) at 116.] Dr. Hirsche testified that a doctor may vary the way medicine is 
used for the good of a patient and that he did not consider Dr. Jensen to be suggesting a false 
diagnosis to Ms. Sawyers. [K 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.] On June 17,1996, the Media Defendants 
aired the second broadcast. [PL's Ex. 20.] They falsely represented that Dr. Jensen gave Ms. 
Sawyers a prescription without following state law. They reported: 1) the physician must 
determine that the patient made a good-faith effort to lose weight; 2) the physician must perform 
a physical examination; and 3) the physician must rule out the existence of health conditions that 
would be aggravated by the drug. Ms. Sawyers stated Dr. Jensen did none of these. But Dr. 
Jensen did determine Ms. Sawyers made a good-faith effort to lose weight. He had her medical 
history, asked questions, and knew her blood pressure. He was not able to finish the 
examination only because she abruptly left before the examination was completed. Finally, Dr. 
Jensen did rule out any contraindications. [K 6866 Qensen) at 139; 192; & 6865 (Jensen) at 85; 
130-31.] Ms. Sawyers reported that the State said Dr. Jensen broke the law a second time when 
he made the Dexedrine statement. Dr. Jensen's statement, however, was not illegal. [R. 6865 
Qensen) at 116; & 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.] Further, the State was never after his license. [K 6857 
(Allred) at 99.] On November 6,1996, the Media Defendants did their third broadcast. [PL's 
Ex. 21.] Using earlier excerpts, they placed Dr. Jensen in the same category as physicians who: 
performed illegal abortions; disfigured patients; sexually abused patients; passed out drugs to 
drug addicts; or killed patients with lethal injections. [PL's Ex. 21.] Further, Ms. Sawyers stated* 
"Dr. Michael Jensen - He's the one we caught on tape promising me illegal drugs." [PL's Ex. 
21.] DOPL Qiairman Dr. Van Komen testified that Dexedrine is not an illegal drug. Rather 
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"illegal drugs are Scheduled 1, such as cocaine and marijuana." [K 6857 (Van Komen) at 145.] 
m. Later the district court ruled the jury's awards under §§ 76-9-402(1) (a) and 76-9-
402(l)(b) and the common law intrusion claim were duplicative and reduced them bytwo-thirds, 
n The district court also declined to award attorney's fees for work performed on the 
broadcast claims and for work performed by attorney Wesley Sine. 
o. The Court declined to award necessary disbursements which included the following 
expert witness costs: 
1) BYU Communications Professor Alfred D. Pratte, in the amount of 
$4,667.50. The trial court allowed only $18.50. Professor Pratte testified the Media Defendants 
did not comply with journalism standards. 
2) Editor of the "Journal of Mass Media Ethics," Dr. Ralph Barney, in the 
amount of $1,989.65. The trial court allowed only $18.50. He testified that the Media 
Defendants did not conduct the kind of journalism investigation and analysis that would justify 
using a hidden camera. 
3) Prominent Utah County Physician, Dr. Blaine Hirsche (now deceased), in 
the amount of $1,500.00. The trial court allowed only $26.60 as a witness and service fee. He 
testified that Dr. Jensen met the community standard of medical care. He also testified how 
physicians view and abide by DOPL prescription regulations. 
4) Physician Dr. Michael Rosen, in the amount of $9,790.00. The trial court 
did not allow any of Dr. Rosen's costs. Dr. Rosen testified that Dr. Jensen met the standard of 
care for general practitioners in the medical community. 
5) CPA Dean Smith, in the amount of $13,725.00. The trial court allowed 
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only $67.50 of Mr. Smith's costs. Mr. Smith testified and described Dr. Jensen's pecuniary 
losses. 
6) Economist, Dr. FrankStuart, in the amount of $26,129.66. The trial court 
allowed only $67.50. He testified about the reduction of Dr. Jensen's income and losses. 
p. The parties timely filed their notice of appeal and notice of cross-appeal. 
2. Response to the Media Defendants' Statement of Facts 
The foregoing are the dispositive facts relevant to the issues presented for review. The 
problems with the Media Defendants' Statement of Facts are first, instead of marshaling the 
facts in support of the verdict, they seek to retry their case on appeal. See South Central Utah v 
A uditingDvu, 951 P.2d 218,226 (Utah 1997). Second, many of the facts are not relevant to the 
issues for review. Third, many of the "factual" allegations are actually argument. Fourth, each 
allegation is not numbered, making it difficult to respond. Nevertheless, to weed out what is and 
is not a statement of fact relevant to an issue for review, Dr. Jensen responds as follows: 
a. The heading on page 8 is not a statement of fact. It is legal argument. What occurred 
at the party was not a part of the claims at issue. Most importantly, they omit and misconstrue 
facts as follows: Lisa Johnson was romantically involved with KTVX's managing editor, Roth. 
[R 6849 (Roth) at 103.] Mr. Roth authored the "Story idea". See App. 1. Then Ms. Johnson 
told Dr. Jensen that as a "Deseret Nem" food critic, she was required to frequently eat out. [R 
6865 (Jensen) at 82; R. 6845 (Johnson) at 57.] Ms. Johnson said she was exercising and asked 
about weight-reducing options. [R. 6865 (Jensen) at 82; R. 6845 (Johnson) at 57.] Dr. Jensen 
responded with different options including prescriptions. [K 6865 (Jensen) at 83; & 6845 
(Johnson) at 57.] The assertion that Ms. Johnson was not interested in using diet pills is contrary 
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to the evidence believed by the jury Dr. Jensen testified Ms. Johnson asked him for diet pills. 
[R 6865 Qensen) at 82-83.] Only after he informed her of the contraindications did she say she 
would not be taking medication. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 82-83 & 107; R 6845 Qohnson) at 59.] 
Contrary to the statement that "Ms. Johnson had never been a patient of Dr. Jensen's", the 
evidence at trial was she could be considered his patient. [R 6866 Qensen) at 126-28.] The 
Media Defendants misstate that before "prescribing Fastin, Dr. Jensen did not conduct any 
physical examination of Ms. Johnson/' Appellants' Brief at 8. At trial, however, there was 
testimony that Dr. Jensen complied with the community's standard of medical care. [R 6848 
(Rosen) at 105; R 6871 (Hirsche) at 109.] Dr. Jensen asked whether she was on medications, 
and asked questions about her general health. He also knew her exercise routine indicated that 
her general health was good. [R 6865 Qensen) at 85-86; R 6866 Qensen) 129-130.] The Media 
Defendants misstate "... nor did he [Dr. Jensen] 'determine[ ] . . . through review of the records 
of prior treatment... that Qohnson] ha[d] made a substantial, good faith effort to lose weight 
in a treatment program... without the utilization of controlled substances.'" Appellants' Brief 
at 8. Prior to prescribing Fastin, Dr. Jensen determined that Ms. Johnson made a good faith 
effort to lose weight. [R 6866 (Jensen) at 139.] Further, Dr. Jensen asked her to come to his 
clinic for monitoring and treatment. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 88.] Later, Ms. Johnson told Dr. 
Jensen that she would not use the prescription. [R 6856 Qensen) at 14; R 6845 (Johnson) at 
59.] The Media Defendants misstate "Dr. Jensen did not determine whether there were 
contraindications to the use of Fastin." Appellants' Brief at 9. Dr. Jensen testified he told Ms. 
Johnson about the contraindications of Fastin. [R 6865 Qensen) at 85.] The Media Defendants 
state "[i]n fact, Ms. Johnson has a heart condition that could have been seriously aggravated if 
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she took the amphetamine Dr. Jensen prescribed." Appellants' Brief at 9. That is probably why 
after Dr. Jensen explained the contraindications of Fastin to her, she told him that she would 
not fill the prescription. Media Defendants misstate "[i]t is undisputed that Dr. Jensen's 
prescribing of Fastin to Ms. Johnson was in violation of Utah Admin. Code R156-37-ll(14)»" 
Reg 156-37-3 reads that "nothing in these rules is intended to impose any limitations on a 
physician . . . to administer or dispense controlled substances in accordance with generally 
accepted medical practice."6 Physicians testified that Dr. Jensen's conduct met the medical 
standard of care and the jury believed them. [R 6848 (Rosen) at 105; R 6871 (Hirsche) at 109.] 
b. The heading on p. 9 is factually wrong. Media experts testified that the claimed 
investigation was deficient. [R 6848 (Pratte) at 177-78.] 
c. Mr. Roth did more than discuss the social event with his news director. ¥k 
recommended that Ms. Sawyers falsely pose as a patient, and try to trick Dr. Jensen into 
prescribing diet drugs. [R 6849 (Roth) at 117.] 
d. Ms. Sawyers did not call to discuss diet pills. She called to falsely portray herself as 
a patient and to wrongfully persuade him to prescribe drugs. When Dr. Jensen refused, she 
avoided an appointment, and again asked for drugs. [R 6865 0ensen) at 119; R 6866 at 24; R 
6868 (Scott) at 71-75,79-80]. Further, she first spoke with Dr. Jensen's office manager, Laurie 
Scott ("Scott"), who relayed the following information: Ms. Sawyers said she wanted him to 
prescribe diet pills over the phone. She said she needed to lose 5 pounds before her next stoiy 
because "it's a dog-eat-dog world out there" and she was receiving management pressure to lose 
weight or lose her job. Ms. Sawyers said she wanted Dr. Jensen to prescribe pills immediately 
6The court ruled that the regulations were guidelines, not law [R 1016,1021-22]. 
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and that she was too busy and tired to go to Utah County. She also said the overweight people 
get the "crappy shifts" on TV and that is why Shelly Osterloh never had prime time coverage. 
[R 6868 (Scott) at 72-75.] Dr. Jensen believed that Ms. Sawyers was about to lose her job 
because of her weight. [R 6865 (}ensen) at 119.] 
e. Heading No. 3 and the paragraph thereafter are wrong. The truth was that when the 
Media Defendants' scheme to trick Dr. Jensen into prescribing drugs over the phone failed, they 
decided to have Ms. Sawyers again falsely pose as a patient, secredy videotape him, and persuade 
him to prescribe diet drugs. [R 6849 (Roth) at 117.] 
f. The description of what occurred at the First Med Clinic is wrong. Dr. Jensen's 
examination of Ms. Sawyers included, but was not limited to the following: A comprehensive 
medical history was taken; blood pressure, pulse and respiration were charted by Dr. Jensen's 
staff and reviewed by him - he wrote on the chart that Ms. Sawyers had no medical problems 
[R 6865 Qensen) at 125-26.]; a determination was made that Ms. Sawyers was not on any 
medication and was not allergic to drugs [R 6866 (Jensen) at 189; R 6865 at 128.]; her age and 
gender were noted [R 6865 (Jensen) at 127-28.]; her eyes, coloring, hands and feet appeared 
normal. [R 6866 (Jensen) at 186,193.] SeeApp. 3. After considering the medical information, 
conducting a lengthy interview, and noting Ms. Sawyers' expressed desire to lose weight to save 
her job, he prescribed Fastin and Pondimin and continued his examination. [R 6865 (Jensen) 
at 126-30; Defs.' Ex. 77A; R 6847 (Sawyers) at 100.] Deceitfully, as Dr. Jensen was about to 
complete his work (including weighing Ms. Sawyers and listening to her heart), she abruptly 
exited the examination room. She had what she wanted. [R 6865 0ensen) at 130-31; R 6866 
(Jensen) at 192 Ins. 17-19.] Dr. Jensen testified he asked Ms. Sawyers if she had diabetes. [R 
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6866 (Jensen) at 56.] Also, diabetes is not a contraindication to diet pills. [R 6866 Qensen) at 
56.] 
g. Media Defendants' misstate that Ms. Sawyers was not overweight, implying that Dr. 
Jensen should not have prescribed Phen-Fen. Appellants' Brief at 12. Physicians testified that 
Dr. Jensen was within the standard of care in prescribing diet pills. [R 6871 (Hirsche) at 109; 
R 6848 (Rosen) at 105.] Further, after viewing the tape, Dr. Purser stated doctors look at the 
patient's body habitis and size. He said: "if you look at that video, you can see that her derriere 
hangs out over the sides of the chair," implying that she looked large enough for him to 
prescribe diet medication. [R 6869 (Purser) at 102.] 
h. On page 12 of the Media Defendants' Brief, they quote a portion of the hidden 
camera transcript. Gting this exchange is misleading and demonstrates the Media Defendants' 
failure to marshal the facts. Dr. Jensen testified that before any broadcast he told Ms. Sawyers 
that when he said Dexedrine was technically illegal to use as a diet pill, he meant that the rules 
and regulations; discouraged a Schedule II substance, which is Dexedrine, to be used as weight 
reduction. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 116.] The regulations, which Sawyers read, state that they are 
guidelines and the lower court so ruled. Dr. Hirsche testified doctors may vary the way medicine 
is used for the good of a patient, and he did not consider Dr. Jensen to be suggesting a false 
diagnosis. [R 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.] Most importantly, prior to the first story, Dr. Jensen did 
an on-camera interview and he explained he had done additional research; and said Dexedrine 
was used for weight loss when he was in medical school, but that it was not used now. [PL's Ex. 
37 at 6] The Media Defendants left Dr. Jensen's correction out of any of their stories. They 
leave it out now. 
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I On page 13 of the Media Defendants' Brief, they quote another portion of Defs. Ex. 
99. Gting this exchange again demonstrates a failure to marshal. Dr. Jensen explained that he 
was referring to the fact that he had some patients on Fastin, one of which stated that when 
Fastin wore off, she would get tired and could not function, and that he had had a similar 
experience. He also testified he believed Ms. Sawyers had work fatigue, so he explained to her 
a way to avoid crashing once Fastin wore off. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 138-40.] Dr. Hirsche testified 
that Dr. Jensen was not telling her how to abuse the drugs, he was telling her how not to abuse 
it. [K 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.] 
j . The Media Defendants misstate: "[a]t no time during the office visit did Dr. Jensen tell 
Sawyers that he wanted his conversation with her to be 'confidential' or that Sawyers should not 
disclose it to any third party." This statement makes it sound as if Dr. Jensen knew that she was 
doing a story on him. He did not. [K 6864 (Sawyers) at 116 (testified that she did not tell Dr. 
Jensen she was going to photograph him); & 6871 (Sawyers) at 57-60.] Nor did Dr. Jensen 
know Ms. Sawyers was recording with a hidden camera. [R 6871 (Sawyers) at 60.] Dr. Jensen 
believed he was treating a patient for weight loss who feared losing her job because KTVX 
determined she was overweight. [R 6871 (Sawyers) at 58-59; & 6865 (Jensen) at 99-100,119; 
K 6866 (Jensen) at 36, 58,117-18.] 
k The heading on page 15 and subsequent paragraphs are incorrect. The Media 
Defendants did not continue their investigation. Instead, they showed a portion of the hidden 
camera tape and not the second on-camera interview tape to DOPL, and asked what it would 
do about Dr. Jensen. [K 6871 (Sawyers) at 83-84; PL's Ex. 19.] Further, Ms. Sawyers did not 
disclose to DOPL that the hidden camera tape did not show the last 15 minutes of the 
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examination because it shut off prematurely. [K 6871 (Sawyers) at 84-85; & 6866 (Jensen) at 
39.] 
1. The only reason Ms. Sawyers did a second interview was because she bungled the 
installing of the hidden camera. She lacked video of Dr. Jensen. [K 6871 (Sawyers) at 63-64.] 
Consequently, Ms. Sawyers did a second on-camera interview. [K 6866 (Jensen) at 8-9; PL's Ex. 
37.] Dr. Jensen did not confirm the "illegality' of his earlier Dexedrine statement. Dr. Jensen 
told Ms. Sawyers that prescribing Dexedrine is something that cannot be done now in 
conformity with state regulations. [PL's Ex. 37 at 6.] The Media Defendants never included that 
statement in any broadcast. [PL's Ex.s 19,20,21.] Further, as explained to the jury, physicians, 
based on medical judgment, are allowed to make prescriptions outside the regulations. [K 6865 
(Jensen) at 116; K 6871 (Hirsche) at 133.] The Court ruled the regulations were guidelines. [R 
1016,1021-22] 
m. On September 5,1995, they aired the first false light broadcast.7 [PL's Ex. 19 &Defs. 
Ex. 115.] It falsely represented that Dr. Jensen offered illegal drugs to Ms. Sawyers. [PL's Ex. 
19 &Defs. Ex. 115.] It further falsely insinuated that Lynette Singleton was Dr. Jensen's patient 
by showing her picture and stating that she had easily obtained diet pills from her doctor. [PL's 
Ex. 19 & Defs. Ex. 115.] She was not. The broadcast showed clips of the hidden camera 
interview and the second interview, while making the viewer think that Ms. Sawyers had done 
one continuous interview. [PL's Ex. 19 &Defs. Ex. 115.] The story did not include Dr. Jensen's 
filmed correction. [PL's Ex. 19.] 
n. Following the first broadcast, IHC dropped Dr. Jensen from its insurance plans. [R 
7No one at KTVX had any hidden-camera experience. [R 6864 (Edwards) at 19.] 
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6866 (Jensen) at 63.] Dr. Jensen cannot bill the largest insurance provider in the state for 
medical services to patients. [K 6866 Qensen) at 64.] Dr. Jensen was denied reinstatement. [K 
6866 Qensen) at 66,112-15; PL's Ex. 199.] He was also fired from the FirstMed Clinic. [R 6866 
(Jensen) at 62.] 
o. In section 8 of their Brief, the Media Defendants fail to admit they hounded DOPL 
to go after Dr. Jensen. [R. 6871 (Sawyers) at 83-85.] 
p. On June 17,1996 Media Defendants aired the second false light broadcast. [PL's Ex. 
20.] They falsely said Dr. Jensen gave Ms. Sawyers a prescription without following state law. 
The broadcast reported: 1) physicians must determine that the patient made a good-faith effort 
to lose weight; 2) physicians must perform a thorough physical examination; and 3) physicians 
must rule out the existence of health conditions that would be aggravated by the drug. Ms. 
Sawyers stated that Dr. Jensen did none of these. However, he did determine that Ms. Sawyers 
had made a substantial good-faith effort to lose weight. Also, he was not able to finish the 
examination because she abruptly left his office. And Dr. Jensen did rule out contraindications. 
[R 6866 Qensen) at 139; 192 Ins. 17-19; K 6865 (Jensen) at 85; 130-31.] Ms. Sawyers also said 
Dr. Jensen broke the law a second time when he made the Dexedrine statement. However, as 
described above, the statement was not illegal. [K 6865 (Jensen) at 116; & 6871 (Hirsche) at 
133.] 
q. On November 6, 1996, the Media Defendants defamed Dr. Jensen. [PL's Ex. 21.] 
Using excerpts from earlier broadcasts, the Media Defendants placed Dr. Jensen in the same 
category as physicians who: perform illegal abortions; disfigure patients; sexually abuse their 
patients; pass out drugs to drug addicts; and/or kill patients with lethal injections. The story 
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implied Dr. Jensen was the physician who gave drugs to addicts. [PL's Ex. 21.] Ms. Sawyers 
repeated her statement regarding the promise of illegal drugs, knowing what Dr. Jensen really 
said was "if Fastin didn't work for you, I would be willing to work with you uh rmybe using 
Dexedrine." [Def.'s Ex. 99 at 2 (emphasis added).] She also knew from the second interview 
Dr. Jensen would not prescribe Dexedrine to her. [PL's Ex. 37 at 6.] Additionally, the 
Physicians Licensing Board Chairman testified that Dexedrine is not an illegal drug. Rather, 
"illegal drugs are Schedule 1 such as cocaine and marijuana." [K 6857 (Van Komen) at 145.] 
r. The Media Defendants wrongfully state that Dr. Jensen did not present any evidence 
showing that he lost any job, position or was denied work opportunities as a result of the third 
broadcast. Appellant's Brief at 21. Dr. Jensen's economic losses were earlier summarized. 
While Dr. Jensen did finally find employment after being fired from nearly all the positions he 
was then working at because of the broadcasts, working as a nursing home physician is the last 
place Dr. Jensen wanted to work as a physician. [R 6866 (Jensen) at 102 (Dr. Jensen testified 
that nursing home medicine is one of the least desirable type of jobs for a physician).] Further, 
without IHC coverage, many patients cannot be treated by Dr. Jensen because they will not 
receive reimbursement from insurance. [K 6866 (Jensen) at 63-64.] 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Appellee's Argument 
Dr. Jensen's 'false light invasion of privacy claims are not time-barred. A 'false light 
invasion of privacy is one of four different categories falling under the INVASION OF 
PRIVACY TORT. Invasion of Privacy is not a defamation tort. It is a separate and distinct 
tort. Consequently, it is not subject to the one-year statute of limitation in § 78-12-29(4) which 
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covers defamation, slander and libel. See Ccoc v Hatthy 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988) wherein both 
torts are analyzed. A 'false light tort claim' is based upon true or false statements which place 
the individual in a false light to his determent. In contrast a defamation tort consists of false 
statements which injure the reputation of the individual. 
Dr. Jensen's invasion of privacy by way of intrusion arises from the surreptitious video 
recording of Dr. Jensen by Ms. Sawyers while being treated as a patient in a private examination 
room with the door closed. They are actionable. All the doctors who were asked testified that 
they would be highly offended if secretly taped while treating a patient. They all had the 
expectation that the examination room was a private place for the physician. 
Dr. Jensen was also the subject of the Media Defendants' attempt to show that DOPL 
was not properly performing its function to regulate doctors under its charge. The Media 
Defendants tried to mold Dr. Jensen to its predetermined "Story idea" in order to put pressure 
on DOPL to change its way and to go after Dr. Jensen. 
Each of the broadcasts were not substantially true. The first broadcast's innuendo was 
that Dr. Jensen was Lynette Singleton's doctor from whom she had obtained diet pills very 
casually. He was not. Many of the Media Defendants' statements were flat-out false as 
exemplified by Ms. Sawyers repeated allegation that Dr. Jensen had promised her illegal drugs. 
He did not. In the second broadcast the Media Defendants alleged that the State was going after 
the license of Dr. Jensen. See Defendants/Appellants Exhibit 9. The truth according to a 
DOPL Assistant Attorney General and also the head of the physicians licensing board was that 
DOPL never sought revocation of Dr. Jensen's license. [R 6857 (Allred) at 99.] Further, Dr. 
Jensen did not instruct Ms Sawyers how to abuse a drug but instructed her as how not to abuse 
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the drug. [K 6865 Qensen) at 139-141.] 
Dr. Jensen testified that he was injured most by the third broadcast. From this broadcast, 
the clinic, which had supported him throughout the ordeal of the earlier two broadcasts, warned 
him that if the notoriety continued they would have to let him go. They then started to cut back 
his hours. The cut in hours forced him to go into the nursing home industry with its poor pay, 
long hours, and serious mental stress due to the terminal illnesses of nursing home patients. The 
jury had the unique opportunity of being able to see the hidden camera tape, the interview tape, 
and the three broadcasts which were produced. From that they were able to determine the truth 
or falsity of the broadcasts and the statements contained therein. 
B. Cross-Appellant* s Argument 
The Media Defendants could not have done the three broadcasts without the hidden 
camera video. As the hidden camera episode violated § 76-9-402(1) (a) and (b), and under § 76-
9-406 attorney fees are allowed where there has been a violation of § 76-9-401 etaL, the Media 
Defendants should be assessed attorney fees for all damage caused by their violation of 76-9-
402(1) (a) and (b). Further, the gathering of information claims are the proximate cause of the 
broadcast claims in such a way as to justify an attorney s fee award on all claims. 
The jury's award was not duplicative and all of Dr. Jensen's claimed costs should be 
awarded as necessary disbursements. 
VI. APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
A. The Issues of Fact Raised by the Media Defendants in this Appeal 
Must, as a Matter of Law, be Determined in Favor of Dr. Jensen. The 
Media Defendants Failed to Marshal the Evidence. 
When challenging a jury's verdict, the appellant must "marshal the evidence in support 
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of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict." Hardngv Bell, 2002 UT 108,119,57 P.3d 1093,1097. 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's 
advocate. Counsel must remove himself or herself from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order 
to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw 
must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Nedyv Bennett, 2002 UT App 189,111, 51 P.3d 724,727-28 (citation omitted). 
The duty to marshal is not "satisfied by merely making the 'pertinent excerpts from the 
record readily available to a reviewing court,' nor by presenting 'in minute detail all the evidence 
before' the trial court." Id (citations omitted.) Instead, the appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the findings and show why, given all of the evidence supporting the 
findings, the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence." Harris v IE S Assoc, 2003 UT 
App. 112,140,471 Utah Adv. Rep. 9. "The marshaled facts should 'correlate particular items 
of evidence with the challenged findings,' supporting the findings with all available evidence in 
the record, and only then should an appellant attempt to demonstrate how the challenged 
findings are clearly erroneous." Nedy, 2002 UT App 189,112, 51 P.3d 724, 728. In the face 
of an appellant's failure to properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court's "most likely 
action is summary affirmance of the challenged trial court decision." Id 
In this case, the Media Defendants make six arguments. All but the first raise issues of 
fact, La, whether the evidence supported a motion for summary judgment, a directed verdict, 
or a motion to set aside the verdict. Nowhere do the Media Defendants marshal the evidence. 
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All they do is argue selective evidence favorable to their position. The Media Defendant's 
arguments do not even begin to meet their marshaling burden. See Crvokston v Five Ins. Exdo., 
817 P.2d 789,800 (Utah 1991). When an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, it cannot show 
that the findings are clearly erroneous and the reviewing court must presume that the evidence 
supported the verdict. Harding, 2002 UT 108,121, 57 P.3d at 1097. As a result, the findings 
of fact of the trial court and the jury must be accepted as true. The Media Defendants' failure 
to meet their marshaling burden is alone sufficient grounds to reject any challenges to the jury's 
findings. See Crvokston, 817 P.2d at 800. 
Furthermore, it is now too late for the Media Defendants to remedy their failure to meet 
their marshaling burden. "[A] party must marshal all of the evidence supportive of the verdict 
in its opemngbruf." Harding 2002 UT 108,121 n3,57 P.2d at 1097, n3. (emphasis added). Rule 
24(c), Utah & App. Proa, further dictates, the failure to marshal the evidence cannot be 
remedied in a reply brief. An appellant cannot reserve its sufficiency of the evidence challenge 
and wait to marshal the evidence in a reply brief. Such a procedure would deprive the appellee 
of any opportunity to respond and defend the sufficiency of the evidence and the findings of 
fact. See A das Steel, Incy v Utah State Tax Commn, 2002 UT 112,141, 61 P.3d 1053,1062. 
B. An Appellate Court Does Not Review a Pretrial Denial of Summary 
Judgment After Juiy Trial and Adverse Judgment on the Merits. 
Sections; 1,2 & 4 of the Media Defendants' argument are based on a summary judgment 
denial. Many jurisdictions, including the Tenth Circuit, have ruled that a summary judgment 
denial is not reviewable on appeal after a trial. See Whalenv Unit Rig Inc, 97A F.2d 1248 (10th 
Gr. 1992). "[S]ummary judgment was not intended to be a bomb planted within the litigation 
at its early stages and exploded on appeal." Id at 1251. (quoting Holleyv Northmp Worldwide 
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Aircraft Sens., Inc., 835 F.2d 1375,1377-78 (11th Or. 1988). 
Judicial economy does not allow an appeal of a denial of summary judgment after a full 
trial because the purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of 
a trial. See McBridev Jones, 615 P.2d 431 (Utah 1980). A summary judgment motion becomes 
moot. SeePahuta v Massey-Fergison, Inc., 170 F.3d 125 (2d Qr. 1999); Gregory v Kilbride, 565 
S.E.2d 685 (N.C Q. App. 2002); Chesapeake Paper Prods. Ca v Stone & Webster Engg Corp., 51 
F.3d 1229 (4th Qr. 1995) (Court of Appeak will not review a pretrial denial of motion for 
summary judgment after full trial and final judgment on merits); Watson v A rmicD Steel, Inc., 29 
F.3d 274 (7th Or. 1994) (same); Metropolitan Life Ins.Ca v Golden Triangle, 121 F.3d 351 (8th Or. 
1997) (agreeing with the 9th and Federal Circuits that once a party lost at summary judgment and 
subsequently loses after a trial, the denial of summary judgment cannot be appealed. 
C. The Tort of False Light Invasion of Privacy is Governed by the Utah Four-
Year Statute of Limitation. It is Not an Enumerated Exception to the 
Residual Four-Year Limitation Period of UCA§ 78-12-25(3). 
The scope of the four-year limitation period in subsection (3) of § 78-12-25 has been 
clear for over 100 years: "torts having nowhere else been provided for in the statute. . . [are] 
embraced under the general provisions of Section 20, [now sub-section (3)] of UCA § 78-12-25." 
See Thorns v UnionPac RRCa, 1 Utah 235 (1875). As the Utah Appellate Court acknowledged 
in Hodgs v Hoidl, 2000 UT App 171,19, 4 P.3d 803, 805, section 78-12-25(3) "applies to all 
actions for relief that [are] not otherwise covered by any other section." citing Branting v Salt 
Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 311, 153 P. 995, 1001 (1915). Seealso, Olsenv Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 
1347 n.l (Utah 1993) ("A cause of action... that is not subject to a specific statutory limitation 
period is governed by the residual four-year limitation period found in § 78-12-25(3).") 
Utah courts have newr held that any specific statute of limitation applies to a false light 
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invasion of privacy claim There is, however, compelling case law applying other states' catch-all 
provision to false light invasion of privacy claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals forthe 10th Circuit 
upheld a Kansas court ruling that the "statute of limitations for an invasion of privacy claim" 
fell under the two-year tort catch-all provision. Nezwombv En$e, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Gr. 
1987); see also, Janes v HCA Health Senkes (f Kansas, Inc, 1998 WL 159505 * 17 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(the court refused to apply the 1-year defamation statute of limitation, holding that the two-year 
catch-all statute of limitations applies to "invasion of privacy actions including those based on 
false light publicity"). Similarly, in Auk v HustlerMagzzine, Inc., 1986 WL 20896 * 6 (D. Or. 
1986) the court noted that the Oregon legislature, like the Utah legislature, had not "enumerated 
the statute of limitations for invasion of privacy" and held that the two-year statute of limitations 
for invasion of privacy applied. In Jensen v Times Mirror Company, 634 F. Supp. 304, 315 (D. 
Conn. 1986) the federal court found that a false light claim is not otherwise covered by a specific 
statute of limitation, the all embracing three-year tort statute of limitations applied. 
Even though the tort of false light invasion of privacy is not specifically enumerated in 
any statute of limitation, the Media Defendants mistakenly argue that the one-year statute of 
limitation for "defamation" should apply. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (1996). They say 
the nature of those two torts are so "closely allied" that the same limitation period applies to 
each. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitation to be applied is 
determined "by the nature of the action and not by the pleading labels chosen." DauckonLurrber 
Sales, Inc v Bonneulle Imi, Inc, 794 P.2d 11, 14 (Utah 1990). In Cathoo, Inc v Valentiner Crane 
Bruryes OnpnAvchitects, 944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 1997), the Court reaffirmed explaining, "[f]or 
purposes of determining the statute of limitations, it is the gravamen of the claim which governs, 
not the form in which it is pleaded." Just because two torts may both involve the same conduct, 
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that does not "ally the two closely enough to share the same limitation period. Application of 
this test in Hodges v Howell, supra is instructive, as the factual analysis of Hodges, is so similar to 
the present case that it dictates the conclusion that defamation and false light are distinct and 
separate. In Hodges the issue was which limitation period applied to the tort of "alienation of 
affection." No limitation period for this tort is specified in statute. The plaintiff argued 
alienation of affection is so "closely related with" seduction that they should share the one year 
limitation period. The Utah Appellate Court recognized both torts may involve the same 
conduct, ie, sexual relations, but that sexual relations was not an essential element of alienation 
of affection, finding that the elements of the torts were not the same and the interests protected 
were not the same. The court concluded that they were not sufficiently related to share the same 
limitation period. 
Using this same analysis, the Supreme Court mRussdlv ThomsonNeuspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 
896 (Utah 1992), held that the invasion of privacy is "distinct" from defamation. The Court 
recognized that the tort of defamation only protects an individual's reputation while the tort of 
invasion of privacy, false light, protects an "individual's interest in being let alone." The 
gravamen of a false light invasion of privacy action constitutes"publicity that unreasonablyplaces 
the other in a false light before the public. See Ccoc v Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652 A & 652E (1977). Unlike defamation, the statements 
complained of in an action for false light need not be false. In fact, "an action for invasion of 
privacy may be the only available remedy when the statements complained of are not themselves 
false, but merely place plaintiff in a false light." Russell, 842 P.2d at 906-907. The Court 
concluded that an invasion of privacy claim such as false light invasion of privacy is distinct from 
a defamation claim. They are not "so closely allied" so as to share the same limitation period. 
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The trial court correctly applied the four-year residual limitation period of § 78-12-25(3). 
D. The Evidence Geariy Supports and the Jury Properly Found the Media 
Defendants' Intrusion was Substantial and Highly Offensive. 
The Media Defendants make four arguments relating to the sufficiency of the evidence 
on the invasion of privacy claims: 1) whether there was an intrusion into Dr. Jensen's "sphere 
of personal privacy;" 2) whether the Media Defendants' actions were "highly offensive;" 3) 
whether Dr. Jensen had a reasonable expectation of privacy as a state-licensed and regulated 
physician; and 4) whether the defamatory and false-light statements were "substantially true." 
All of these involve issues of fact and were found in favor of Dr. Jensen by the jury on 
the evidence. Although, the Media Defendants site to numerous cases whose fact situations 
result in a ruling against the plaintiff, they are all fact specific and distinguishable. Nowhere do 
the Media Defendants marshal the evidence supporting the jury's findings upheld by the lower 
trial court in not directing a verdict for Appellants or in granting a judgment not withstanding 
the verdict. 
1. The Media Defendants Tortuously and Unreasonably Intruded Upon Dr. 
Jensen's "Sphere of Personal Privacy" 
A successful plaintiff must prove two elements to establish an intrusion upon seclusion 
claim: (a) there was "an intentional substantive intrusion, physically or otherwise upon the 
solitude or seclusion of the complaining party", and (b) the intrusion "would be highly of fens ive 
to a reasonable person." See Stienv Marriott OwnershipResortsy Inc., 944 P.2d 374, (Utah Q. App. 
1997). The rationale is that one should be protected against intrusion by others into one's 
private "space" orprivate affairs. ".... this intrusion tort gives redress for interference with one's 
'right to be left alone'." Peoplefor theEthical Treatment cfA rirmls v BobbyBenxirri, Ltd, 895 P.2d 
1269 (Nev. 1995). To have a protectable interest in "seclusion," a plaintiff must show that he 
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had an actual expectation of "seclusion or solitude" and that that expectation was reasonable, 
both issues of fact. 
Where the intrusion takes place is not determinative of whether an expectation of 
privacy is reasonable. See Sanders v A rrzrimnBrvackmtin^ 978 P.2d 67,77 (Cal. 1999). 
Sanders involved a TV reporter recording a conversation between the reporter and a telepsychic. 
The California Supreme Court held that since the workplace where the conversation took place 
was not generally open to the public, the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy against 
a TV reporter's covert videotaping even though the plaintiff lacked a reasonable expectation of 
complete privacy because he was visible and audible to other coworkers. Id The 
unreasonableness depended not on location but the nature of the intrusion, i.e., "a television 
reporter's covert videotaping of the conversation" that was meant to be private. Id Likewise, 
the communication between a doctor and his patient is meant to be kept private. 
2. The Media Defendants' Intrusion was "Highly Offensive." 
The determination of the second element of the tort, i e. whether the intrusion was highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, is within the province of the jury. And the jury in this case so 
found. Utah law also provides that the court must make a threshold determination of 
"offensiveness." In doing so the court considers such factors as "the degree of intrusion, the 
context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder's motives 
and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy 
is invaded.8 Stien, 944 P.2d at 379. Although the Media Defendants have not marshaled any 
8This is an interesting judicial gloss. As explained in Stien, it appears that the court must 
make an initial determination that the claim is supported by sufficient evidence to withstand a 
motion for summary judgment and/or a motion for a directed verdict before the claim maybe 
submitted to the jury. The trial court made that determination twice and on the evidence before the 
jury, the jury found for Dr. Jensen on the claim of intrusion. 
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evidence, there was ample evidence upon which the trial judge based his ruling on "objective 
off ensiveness,"9 and upon which the juryfound that the Media Defendants violated Dr. Jensen's 
right to privacy from unreasonable intrusion. See supra Statement of Facts l.g. and R . 6849 
(Taylor) at 229. 
Numerous courts have considered stiikingly similar factual situations and found that the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the intrusion was highly offensive. The 
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Dietemtnv Tine, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Or. 1971), is illustrative. In 
Dietenunn, the object of the intrusion was an individual who was ostensibly practicing medicine 
without a license. L ife Magtzine entered into an arrangement with the District Attorneys Office 
whereby Life's employees would visit the plaintiff, obtain pictures, and record the diagnosis and 
treatment discussion. L ife would obtain evidence for the health department to be used against 
the plaintiff and could then publish the pictures and the recorded conversation. 
Life's employees went to plaintiff's home, misinterpreted why they were there, and by 
using the ruse that "they were sent there by a friend," gained entrance into his den or office, 
equipped with "gadgets" he used in his diagnosis. While the plaintiff "examined" one of the 
employees, the other took a picture. The conversations were transmitted by radio transmitter 
hidden in a purse to a tape recorder in a parked automobile. Consequently, the plaintiff was 
arrested on the charge of practicing medicine without a license, and an article including the 
picture later appeared in Life Magazine. 
On these facts the Ninth Circuit affirmed a trial court judgment for invasion of privacy. 
Dietenunn, 449 F.2d at 248. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the plaintiff invited the Life 
9Most jurisdictions require the court to make an initial determination that the expectation of 
seclusion or solitude is "objectively reasonable." 
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employees into his "den/office" and that the Life employees were parties to the recorded 
conversations. Nevertheless, the court found that such a trespass was an intrusion "into spheres 
from which an ordinary man in plaintiff's position could reasonably expect that the particular 
defendant should be excluded." Id. at 249. The court explained: 
Plaintiff's den was a sphere from which he could reasonably expect 
to exclude eavesdropping newsmen. He invited two of 
defendant's employees to the den. One who invites another to his 
home or office takes a risk that the visitor may not be what he 
seems, and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and observes 
when he leaves. But he does not and should not be required to 
take the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by 
photograph or recording, or in our modem world, in full living 
color and hi-fi to the public at large or to any segment of it that the 
visitor may select. A dfflerentrdeawMhawa mxt pernicious effect upon 
the digrity cfrmn and it would surely lead to yarded conzmations and 
conduct vhere candor is most uduedy eg. in the case cf doctors andlawps. 
Id (Emphasis added). News gathering does not create a license to trespass or to intrude by 
electronic means into another's office. See Copdandv HubbardBroadcasting Inc., d/b/a KSTP 
T. V., 526 N.W.2d 402,405 (Minn. 1995) (whether homeowners consent to allow a student into 
their home for educational purposes encompassed consent to videotape events in the home for 
a broadcast, is a factual issue precluding summary judgment.) 
3. As a State Regulated and Licensed Physician, Dn Jensen still had a 
Reasonable Right to an Expectation of Privacy. 
Dr. Jensen had a reasonable expectation that his examination room is within a sphere of 
privacy for the doctor. This expectation was affirmed by every physician asked at trial. Doctors 
Rosen, Purser, Badger and Canfield all testified the patient examination room is a "private 
place." Dr. Badger explained that he would consider a camera in his patient room as an invasion 
of his privacy. See Statement of Facts No. 8. Even the Media Defendants' expert witness, Dr. 
Jack Taylor, agreed. [& 6849 (Taylor) at 229.] The nature of medical practice dictates that a 
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physician must have an area where he may speak openly to his patient without it being broadcast 
to the general public. Doctors must know their communications will not be broadcast so they 
can be candid in discussing a patient's health problems and remedies. 
The Media Defendants deny such a need of private seclusion. They urge two strings of 
cases they say stand for the notion that "a physician has no expectation of privacy in how he 
conducts his professional duties;" and that there is a "diminished expectation of privacy in the 
workplace." The Media Defendants' analysis is wrong. In support of their first proposition, the 
Media Defendants proffer 3 cases. The first, WashirigonPost Ca v United States Dept cfJustice, 
863 F.2d 96,100 (D.C Qr. 1988), was a Freedom of Information Act case and has nothing to 
do with the case at bar. The D.C Circuit held that unless there was a specific statutory 
exemption from production, all documents held by the government were to be produced 
pursuant to a FOIA request. The second proffered case was New York v Burger, 482 U.S. 691 
(1987), a case involving a warrantless search. It has nothing to do with a civil tort for invasion 
of privacy. Finally, Media Defendants cite Time, Inc. v Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) claiming that 
this case espouses that when one's "professional career is involved," an individual "is 
substantially without a right to privacy." However, that case makes no such holding. Moreover, 
Time is not an expectation of privacy case. Rather, Time held that a "newsworthy person" may 
not have an expectation of privacy insofar as his newsworthy status is concerned, but he does 
have a right to privacy when the reported material contains falsehoods, even if the falsehoods 
relate to the newsworthy event. 
Although a public figure is substantially without a right of privacy, the Supreme Court 
found that insofar as the published comments were 'fictionalized,' the public figure had a claim 
for false light invasion of privacy 
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But the constitutional guarantees can tolerate sanctions against 
calculated falsehood without significant impairment of the 
essential function. We held in New York Times that calculated 
falsehood enjoyed no immunity in the case of alleged defamation 
of a public official concerning his official conduct. Similarly 
calculated falsehood should enjoy no immunity in the situation 
here. 
Tinx, 385 U.S. at 389-390. The Media Defendants also relied on, Spahnv Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y 
2d 324 (1966) which has a similar holding as Time. Warren Spahn, a well known baseball pitcher, 
a public figure, was successful in stopping the publication of an unauthorized, fictionalized, 
biography. 
The issue on appeal in the case at bar is factual. Did the Media Defendants fictionalize 
the encounter with Dr. Jensen? Did they make changes in the wording calculated to mislead 
the public? Did they broadcast false statements and omit correct statements which would have 
revealed the truth? The jury determined that the Media Defendants did. 
It is unnecessary to review each of the Media Defendants' authorities in purported 
support of their claim that the false light claim should have been dismissed. Whether a 
statement is true or false or calculated to mislead, is a factual question. Nowhere do they 
present the evidence which would allow this court to make a determination as to whether the 
juiy had sufficient evidence to support its findings. 
The Media Defendants' second line of cases is proffered to suggest the "location" i.e. 
"work place" is the determining factor of the reasonableness of the privacy expectation. The 
cases proffered by the Media Defendants demonstrates this is not true. And why? Because 
again "reasonable expectation" is an issue of fact. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 67. No one equates the 
expectation of privacy between a doctor and his patient discussing medical problems in a closed 
examination room with the expectation of privacy of a conversation in the administrative office 
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of a medical laboratory involving a discussion with the laboratory's owner about general 
laboratory procedures, Medarf Laboratory Mamgement Consultants v A rrErimnBwadcasttngConpiny^ 
306 F.3d 806 (9th Gr. 2002); with an area backstage at the Stardust Hotel where employees could 
at all times hear and see what Berosini was doing, Berosiri^ 895 P.2d at 1279; with the expectation 
of privacy where an employer knowingly monitors and records its employees' business and 
personal calls, Ali v Dou^as Cable Comntmications, 929 F. Supp. 1362 (D Kan. 1996); and with 
the expectation of the secrecy of a telephone number that is recorded by the phone company 
in the phone company's exchange for legitimate business purposes, Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735 (1979). Further reliance on Smith is misplaced. Srrith dealt with whether obtaining a phone 
number automatically recorded by the phone company when dialed by a defendant, violated 
Fourth Amendment Rights. It has nothing to do with the offering of professional services to 
a "complete stranger." 
E. The Media Defendants' Representations in the Three Broadcasts were not 
Substantially True and the Jury so found on the Evidence. 
In an attempt to overcome the factual determination that the statements in the broadcast 
were defamatory and placed Dr. Jensen in a false light, the Media Defendants rely on claims such 
as: the broadcasts contained "substantial truth," and "while some of the defendants'" published 
statements may not have been literallytrue... the "gist" and "sting" of the broadcasts as a whole 
. . . were mcontrovembly suktantially truthful, and, "[i]n sum, the broadcasts are not actionable 
because they did not make [Dr. Jensen] significantly worse off than a completely or literally 
truthful publication would have." The Media Defendants' argument does not raise an appealable 
issue. Importantly, the jury was properly instructed on the issue of a "false statement".10 And 
10The trial court instructed the jury on the definition of a "false statement" as it relates to 
both the defamation and false light claims. Instruction No. 50 in pertinent part essentially followed 
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after hearing all the evidence, the jury did not find that the broadcasts were "substantially" or 
"literally true or that Dr. Jensen was not "significantly worse off" as a result of the Media 
Defendants' misrepresentations, half truths and innuendo that cast him in a false light. 
Further, the Media Defendants' argument is inaccurate. When one compares what was 
said in the broadcasts with the facts the Media Defendants left out of their Brief, one can see the 
defamation, and the false light. In all broadcasts, they deliberately left out conversations with 
Dr. Jensen and made inferences which cast him in a false light. 
Inferential false light was recognized in Russdl vABQInc, 1995 WL 330920 (N.D. 111. 
1995) where the Court noted that plaintiff complained the "defendants took her statements out 
of context and incorporated them into the broadcast in such a way that a viewer would wrongly 
infer that she was an unscrupulous and dishonest merchant". This the court found to be a 
"classic example of a false light invasion of privacy claim." Id at * 5. "It is not plaintiff's 
statements themselves that allegedly injured her reputation, it was how defendants used those 
statements in their program and allegedly harmed her." Id See also, Haynes v A lived A. Kmphy 
Inc., 8 F.3d 1222,1229 (7th Gr. 1993). A jury in the case at bar could and did conclude that the 
way in which the Media Defendants presented out-takes, played sound bits, and omitted 
material, placed Dr. Jensen in a false light, and injured his reputation. See Ritzmmn v Weekly 
World New, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that "whether the publication 
does actually place the subject in a false light and whether that false light would be highly 
the Media Defendants' proposed instruction No. 36. The instruction covered all the issues of 
"substantial truth as raised by the Media Defendants in their opening brief. The court instructed, 
inter alia, "The statement to be true, need not be absolutely, totally or literally true, but must be 
substantially true. A statement is considered to be true if it is substantially true or that the gist of the 
statement is true. When a statement is so near the truth that fine distinctions must be drawn on 
words pressed out of their ordinary usage to sustain any claim of falsity, you are to consider the 
statement as being true." 
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offensive to a reasonable person are questions of fact"). Id at 1340-41. 
The following examples are offered not in an effort to marshal all the evidence, as that 
is the responsibility of the Appellants, but to indicate to the Court that there was evidence to 









"During our visits he [Dr. Jensen] never asked if I 
had high blood pressure. 
Prior to Dr. Jensen prescribing any pills, his assistant took Ms. 
Sawyers' blood pressure. [R6865 (Jensen) at 125 -126.] The Media 
Defendants admit this fact in footnote 29 on page 39 of then-
Opening Brief. 
"He never asked . . . if I had diabetes." 
Ms. Sawyers filled out her medical history and a complete medical 
checklist. Dr. Jensen reviewed this history prior to prescribing any 
pills. She also told Dr. Jensen she did not have diabetes. [K 6865 
(Jensen) at 125 - 128.] 
"Dr. Jensen did none of these." 
In making this claim the Media Defendants did not explain Ms. 
Sawyers provided her medical history, and that her blood pressure, 
pulse and respiration were charted. [R 6865 (Jensen) at 125 - 126.] 
Further, Dr. Jensen knew that Ms. Sawyers did not have any drug 
allergies. [K 6865 (Jensen) at 128.] This part of the visit was not 
recorded by Ms. Sawyers. Dr. Jensen also reviewed the medical 
history and knew that Ms. Sawyers claimed she would lose her job 
if she did not lose weight. [K 6868 (Scott) at 72-75.] Additionally, 
the recording device turned off before the consultation with Dr. 
Jensen was completed. [R. 6866 (Jensen) at 39 and & 6871 
(Sawyers) at 60-61.] Finally, Ms. Sawyers abruptly changed the 
subject and left the examination room before Dr. Jensen had 
completed his examination. [R. 6865 (Jensen) at 85; 130-31.] 
" . . . Dr. Michael Jensen. He's the one we caught 
on tape promising me illegal drugs." 
Dexedrine is not an "illegal drug." [R. 6857 (Van Komen) at 145.] 
It was, however, not proper to prescribe Dexedrine for weight 
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loss. Dr. Jensen did not offer to prescribe Dexedrine [Def.'s Ex. 
99.] At most, he stated he may be able to. Id The Media 
Defendants admit that "Dr. Jensen did not literally 'promise' 
Sawyers he'd prescribe Dexedrine for her..." See Appellants' Brief 
p. 38. After Dr. Jensen reviewed the regulations he discovered 
that it was no longer proper in Utah to prescribe Dexedrine for 
weight loss and he told Ms. Sawyers this before the first broadcast. 
[PL's Ex. 37 at 6.] 
Representation: "The state is going after Dr. Jensen's license." 
Truth: The State of Utah did not seriously consider revoking Dr. Jensen's license. 
[R6857(Allred)at99.] 
Although Dr. Jensen is a private person, and actual malice need not be shown, the Media 
Defendants knew that material in their broadcasts was false and included it to cast Dr. Jensen 
in a false light. 
F. The Trial Court did Not Abuse its Discretion in Affirming the Jury's 
Award of Damages as a Result of the Media Defendants' Third Broadcast 
After hearing all the evidence, the jury found that Dr. Jensen suffered economic damages 
of $1,000,000 as a result of the Media Defendants' third broadcast. In denying the motion for 
a new trial and to set aside the economic damages flowing from the broadcast, the trial court 
reasonably found the jury acted within its proper bounds. In reviewing a trial judge's ultimate 
decision to grant or deny a new trial or remittitur, an appellate court will only reverse if there is 
no reasonable basis for that decision. See Crookston v Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 
1991). Further, an appellate court "will not disturb this determination absent a gross abuse of 
discretion." Sheets v Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383,1390 (10th Or. 1995). The jury's award of 
damages should not be set aside on appeal unless the jury award is "so excessive . . . as to shock 
the judicial conscience". The amount and allocation of damages must be left to the sound 
discretion of the jury. SeeBurtenshawv Bountiful In. Cay 61 P.2d 312,316 (1936) ("We recognize 
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the fact that damages are not always susceptible to exaa and accurate proof and a great deal of 
latitude must be taken by the jury in fixing the amount of damages in such case In many 
cases, although substantial damages are established, their amount is insofar as susceptible of 
pecuniary admeasurement, either entirely uncertain or extremely difficult of ascertainment; in 
such cases plaintiff is not denied all right of recovery, and the amount is fixed by the jury in the 
exercise of sound discretion under proper instruction of the court.") 
Following the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Jensen and awarding damages, the Media 
Defendants argued that the jury's award of damages relating to the third broadcast was not 
supported by the evidence. Thus, they submitted to the scrutiny of the trial judge the jury's 
determination of economic damages. The trial court considered the motion and reviewed the 
award in light of the evidence and the form of verdict given the jury by the trial court. The trial 
court found that some of the separate damages awarded were duplicative and reduced the 
judgment. But the trial court denied the motion for a new trial and refused to reduce or vacate 
the amount of the jury's award of damages relating to the third broadcast, thus giving further 
solidarity to the judgment. Under these circumstances not only must the appellate court give 
deference to die trial court, the appellate court sustains the verdict and the trial court's refusal 
to set aside the verdict unless the trial court "abused its discretion". 
When the determination of the jury has been submitted to the 
scrutiny and judgment of the trial judge, his [or her] action thereon 
should be regarded as giving further solidarity to the judgment. See 
Elkingonv Foist, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980). Or, as we said in 
Geary v Cain, 69 Utah at 358, 255 P. at 423, a[I]n case of doubt, 
the deliberate action of the trial court should prevail." 
Cmokston, 817 P.2d at 806. 
Whether there is a reasonable basis for the trial court's decision is a question of fact. The 
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Media Defendants recognized this in framing this issue for this court, La, "there was no evidence 
demonstrating that Dr. Jensen had suffered any economic losses as a result of that broadcast." 
But in recognizing that the issue is factual, they still did not give this Court the evidence to 
enable it to decide whether the evidence relied on by the jury and by the trial court was 
sufficient. They failed to marshal the evidence. 
Although the Media Defendants pay lip service to this obligation, they fail miserably. 
The words of the Utah Supreme Court in Gvoksta% supra, apply here: "...[the Media Defendants 
have] made no attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the juiy findings.... In fact, all [the 
Media Defendants] have... done is argue selected evidence favorable to its position. That does 
not begin to meet the marshaling burden it must cany. This failure alone is grounds to rejea 
. . . the attack on the findings/' This is clear from a review of the language on page 41 of 
Appellants' Brief. The Media Defendants simply argue: 
Here, the juiy awarded Dr. Jensen $1 million in pecuniary damages 
on the basis of the third (November 6,1996) broadcast alone. [R 
5782.] However, there was no evidence demonstrating that Dr. 
Jensen had suffered any economic loss as a result of that 
broadcast. The evidence of Dr. Jensen's economic damage at trial 
was based almost entirely on the change of Dr. Jensen's medical 
practice from family to nursing home practice, which occurred, 
according to Dr. Jensen and his experts, as a result of Dr. Jensen's loss 
of IHC Health Plans privileges in September 1995, rrvrethanayear 
prior to the Noimber6> 1996 broadcast [R. 6856 0ensen) at 29, lines 
2 - 5; R 6866 at 103.] 
The Media Defendants refer to or quote some statements made by Dr. Jensen and his experts 
of the effect of the first broadcast on Dr. Jensen's practice. After doing this exercise, the Media 
Defendants state parenthetically on pages 42-43: 
Although Dr. Jensen did testify regarding some negative events 
which may have occurred after November 6. 1996. Le., that his 
work hours at Our City Family Medical Center decreased over 
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time,... [cite omitted] he produced no evidence that such effects 
occurred, if at all, because of the November 6,1996 broadcast.33 
(emphasis added) 
Qtes to the record are omitted. In support of the underlined statement, the Media Defendants 
cite to the following footnote 33 on pg. 43, which also fails to meet the marshaling burden: 
To meet their burden of marshaling the evidence, [Media] 
Defendants can only point to the testimony that Dr. Jensen cited 
in his post-trial brief to support this portion of the judgment (none 
of which establishes that economic losses were caused by the Nov. 
6,1996 broadcast), [cites omitted] 
The Media Defendants then set forth a string of cites to the trial testimony of Dr. Jensen. That 
is the sum and substance of the Media Defendants' attempt at marshaling. Nowhere do the 
Media Defendants refer to Dr. Jensen's statement that he was financially damaged by each of 
the three broadcasts, [R 6866 (Jensen) at 104] or that after the third broadcast he had to find 
another job because he understood that his employer cut back his hours and would fire him. 
[K 6866 0ensen) at 98-99.] Further, he testified that he had been "incredibly injured" by the 
three broadcasts. [K 6866 (Jensen) at 118-119.] There was also testimony that after the third 
broadcast, when Dr. Jensen was seeing patients, a lady in the waiting room saw him, recognized 
him from the broadcast, threw up her arms and said, "I will not see Dr. Jensen." [K 6866 
0ensen) at 43.] This is not the only factual testimony that supports the jury's and trial court's 
finding of damages that resulted from and after the third broadcast. Dr. Frank Stuart also 
testified that he prepared a study wherein he looked at all the facts of the case and made an 
assessment of all the economic losses suffered by Dr. Jensen as a result of all three broadcasts. 
[R. 6850 (Stuart) at 35.] Dr. Stuart testified that Dr. Jensen's pecuniary losses were between 
$1,595,783.00 to $2,195,094.00 including benefits lost. [K 6850 (Stuart) at 69 &PL's Ex. 210.] 
CPA Smith also testified on Dr. Jensen's losses. 
40 
It is true that in presenting their damage calculations at trial, Dr. Jensen's experts did not 
compartmentalize the damages by broadcast. Instead, as Dr. Stuart explained, he prepared his 
damage calculations based on all of the facts of the case. It was left to the trial court's verdict 
form for the jury and ultimately for the trial court itself to apply the content of the three 
broadcasts and the testimony relating to Dr. Jensen's damages to the experts calculation of 
damages suffered by Dr. Jensen and to allocate these damages among the broadcasts. The jury 
did that, and the trial judge who sat through the month-long trial and heard all the evidence 
found the allocation to be reasonable based on the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion. The damage award and judgment must be affirmed. 
G. The Media Defendants' Misstatements arc Not Protected by the Public 
Interest or Fair Report Privileges and they arc Not Entitled to a De Novo 
Review. 
The Media Defendants' statements concerning a private individual are not protected by 
the constitutional actual malice standard. But in this case that is irrelevant. The Media 
Defendants knewthat material in their broadcasts was false and intentionally omitted facts which 
would have shown that the statements made and inference intentionally created in the broadcasts 
were false. The jury found malice and awarded punitive damages in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-18-1. The Media Defendants asserted two qualified privileges against Dr. Jensen's 
defamation and false light claims, now claiming that unless the evidence was sufficient to 
overcome these privileges, punitive damages were not warranted. These privileges protect the 
media from liability for defamatory statements and false light unless "constitutional malice" is 
found. The Media Defendants are wrong. " Constitutional malice" is not the standard, but Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1) (a) is. And, the jury found malice. 
The Media Defendants asserted the "public concern" privilege and the "fair and true 
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report of official proceeding" privilege. Although neither is applicable, both are defeated by the 
jurynecessarilyfinding "malice," ie. that the Media Defendants' statements were known bythem 
to be false, or in making these statements that they had reckless disregard for the truth. 
In Seegrrillerv KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981) this court was called upon to decide 
the degree of fault which a "private figure" must prove in a defamation action against a media 
defendant. KSL argued that a conditional privilege applied to media comment on "a matter of 
public interest." The court concluded there is no "public issue", or "public concern" privilege 
in Utah and found: "[w]e are persuaded that the necessary degree of fault which must be shown 
in a defamation case brought by a "private individual" against the media is negligence. 
Also, Dr. Jensen is not a public figure. In the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion of Gertz v 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the court affirmed that a public figure is one who is thrust 
or thrusts himself into notoriety at the forefront of a public controversy or who by reason of 
their achievements or the vigor and success of their own efforts seek public attention. The Gertz 
court explained that to become a public figure "involuntarily" is "exceedingly rare."11 Dr. Jensen 
is not one of those "exceedingly rare" individuals who has "involuntarily" gained notoriety by 
his achievement. He is not a "public figure." He did not seek fame or notoriety. He has not 
thrust himself to the forefront of any public controversy. Being the subject of a media story 
does not do the trick because the media would always have the privilege that the Gertz court and 
11
 As quoted by this Court in Seegmiller, "[t]hose who, by reason of the notoriety of their 
achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are properly 
classified as public figures... Hypothetically, it maybe possible for someone to become a public 
figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntarily public figures 
must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of 
especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and 
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as 
public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to 
influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment." 
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this court in Seegrriller, irfray found not to exist. There is no constitutional privilege for the Media 
Defendants when commenting on a private individual's actions. And there is no right oideww 
review by the Appellate Court. SeeNewYork Times Ca v SiAlivm> 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
H. The Jury was Shown Clear and Convincing Evidence Supporting a Finding 
of Malice. Subsequently, the Trial Court Found Evidence Sufficient to 
Support the Jury's Finding of Malice when it Denied the Media 
Defendants' Motion for a New Trial. 
The jury was instructed under Jury Instruction 67 that "[bjefore any award of punitive 
damages can be considered on Plaintiff's Defamation or False Light claims, the plaintiff must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant published a defamatory falsehood 
about Plaintiff knowing it was false or in reckless disregard of whether it was true or false and 
that the Defendant acted with 'personal malice' toward Plaintiff. Personal malice means that the 
Defendant acted with hatred or ill will towards Plaintiff, or with an intent to injure Plaintiff, or 
acted willfully or maliciously towards Plaintiff." 
The District Court in its order denying Defendants' Motions for New Trial, to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ruled that "there was 
competent evidence of malice sufficient to sustain the jury's award of punitive damages." See 
Defendants' Ex. 6, Court Order of September 26, 2001. 
Under instruction 67, the jury was held incorrectly to the higher standard established in 
Gertz and set forth in New York Times v Sidlizun, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which bars media liability 
for defamation of a public official absent proof that the defamatory statements were published 
with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. New York Times involved a 
public official suing for libel. Dr. Jensen is not a public official. Even so, the jury found that 
the evidence satisfied the high public official standard for malice. 
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I. Defendants Cannot Justify their Malice by Facts Learned after their 
Actions. 
The Defendants argue that actions which they learned at trial justify their earlier actions. 
Malice is not justified by facts to which they were not privy at the time of the acts, and the 
Media Defendants' portrayal of the facts is not accurate. Dr. Jensen's nurse was an individual 
he had known for a long period of time. He knew her medical history. And she was a medical 
professional. The Media Defendants try to conclude, based on the evidence, that Dr. Jensen was 
derelict in issuing her a prescription. 
The same argument goes to Ms. Johnson. Dr. Jensen was knowledgeable of her medical 
and physical history due to the 10 years of his involvement with her. The testimony from 
numerous medical experts is that they often issued prescriptions away from the office in special 
fact situations. Dr. Jensen did nothing wrong, but the Media Defendants wanted it to be wrong 
to substantiate their preconceived Story. Without the false allegations of prescribing illegal 
drugs, no physical examination, etc., no viewer would have thought anything wrong with what 
Dr. Jensen did in issuing a prescription to Ms. Sawyers. Therefore, they create a scenario to 
justify their Stoiy. The jury saw through the lies and false innuendos, and based on the evidence 
presented, returned a verdict punishing the Media Defendants. 
VII. CROSS-APPELLANTS'ARGUMENT 
A. Dr. Jensen should be Awarded Reasonable Attorneys' Fees on all of his 
Overlapping Claims. 
Prevailing parties are entitled to attorneys' fees on non-compensable claims that partially 
overlap, either factually or legally, compensable claims. Dejawelnc v U.S. Energy Corp, 1999 UT 
App 993 P.2d 222 (contract and tort claims based on related legal theories involving common 
core of facts); Kurth v Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335, 991 P.2d 113, 116 (noncompensable claim 
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partially overlapped mechanic's lien action). In the instant action the lower court recognized the 
overlapping claim concept, but misapplied it: 
Some of Plaintiff's claims are based on obtaining information and 
some are based on the broadcast of information. There is not a 
core of facts common to all claims and the legal theories are 
unrelated. Order July 31,2001 p. 5, lines 1-2. [R. 6779.] 
The court then awarded fees only on the gathering of information claims. 
Although Dr. Jensen's claims can loosely be categorized as gathering of information 
claims and broadcast claims, that does not mean that the claims do not overlap. The opposite 
is true. The media usually argue that the right or ability to gather information is central to its 
ability to publish. See, eg Nixonv Warner ConmrnkutionSy Inc., 435 U.S. 589,609 (1978) (media 
urged the court to find a constitutional right to have witness recordings copied); Bramburg v 
HayeSy 408 U.S. 665,679-80 (1972) (media requested constitutional protection from identifying 
sources); Gannett Ca v DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (petition to overturn the exclusion of the 
press from pretrial proceedings). 
That the gathering of information overlaps the media's ability to place Dr. Jensen in a 
false light is demonstrated in the instant case. First, the Media Defendants used a sensational 
news "story idea". They wanted to trick a doctor into wrongfully prescribing diet pills. [K 6849 
(Roth) at 117.] They tried to persuade Dr. Jensen to do so over the phone even though they 
knew it was wrong. When that failed, Ms. Sawyers committed a criminal act by falsely posing 
as a patient needing diet medication12 and secretly videotaped Dr. Jensen in his examination 
room [Def.'s Ex. 102.] They then selected bits of the tape, ignored Dr. Jensen's statements in 
the second interview, and edited material out of context to broadcast three false but sensational 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402. 
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stories consistent with their preconceived story. 
In short, the gathering of the information was motivated by the Media Defendants' 
original intent to do a sensational story. The misconduct committed in gathering information 
gave the Media Defendants the ability to follow through with their original intent. In other 
words, Dr. Jensen's claims overlap and are related to each other because each claim was part of 
an overall scheme. Consequently, Dr. Jensen should be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees on 
all of his claims. 
B. Attorney Sine's Allocation of Fees between Recoverable and 
Nonrecoverable Fees was Sufficient 
The lower court declined to award attorney's fees to attorney Sine because "Mr. Sine 
simply separated his time into two columns - compensable claims and other matters." Ruling 
September 27,2001, p. 8 lines 17-18. [R 6776.] But, "an allocation is sufficient if the substance 
of the process results in separating recoverable from nonrecoverable fees. Kdth Jorgensens Inc 
vOgkn City Mall Cay 2001 UT App 128,26 P.3d 872,880. Bnxmv DavdK Richardson Gx Inc., 
1999 UT App 109,978 P.2d 470. If the court closely examines Attorney Sine's submissions, it 
will see the criteria for fees was met. [R 6714.] 
C, Dr. Jensen should be Awarded all of His Claimed Costs because the Media 
Defendants Failed to Comply with Rule 54(d)(2) and all of Dr. Jensen's 
Costs were "Necessary Disbursements". 
1. The Media Defendants failed to comply with Rule 54(d)(2). 
Dr. Jensen timely filed his Verified Memorandum of costs and necessary disbursements. 
Theytotal $122,952.66. Rule 54(d)(2) clearly directs: "A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed 
may, within seven days... file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the Court " The 
Media Defendants never filed a motion to tax costs, only an objection. [R 6074.] 
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2. The costs claimed by Dr. Jensen should be awarded as "necessary 
disbursements." 
An application for an award under Rule 54(d)(2) is for "costs and necessary 
disbursements." Dr. Jensen's Verified Memorandum included not only the costs allowed by 
statute, but also deposition transcript costs, expert witness fees, court equipment expenses, and 
out-of-pocket costs to take depositions. [R 5941.] The lower court did not quarrel that Dr. 
Jensen's claimed costs were necessary disbursements. Instead, it strictly applied the rule 
annunciated in Frarrptonv Wilson, 605 P2d 771,774 (Utah 1980) and explained: 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 'there is a distinction to 
be understood' between legitimate and taxable costs and other 
expenses of litigation which may ever be so necessary, but are not 
taxable as costs. [R 6764J 
The Frarrpton rationale is that since costs were not recoverable at common law under the 
American rule, they are allowable only in amounts and in a manner provided by statute. 
Frarrptonv Wilson, 605 P2d at 774. 
There are several compelling reasons why the Frarrpton rule should be reversed or 
modified. First, unlike the FranptonnAe, Rule 54(d), does not distinguish between taxable costs 
and necessary litigation expenses. Rule 54(d)(2) specifically provides that a party is to file a 
verified memorandum of "costs and necessary disbursements." The FranptonnAe completely 
removes the phrase "and necessary disbursements" out of Rule 54(d). 
Further, the FranptonnAe follows the federal system, but the jurisdiction of federal courts 
and Utah courts lead to different outcomes. In the federal system, the United States Supreme 
Court's jurisdiction is limited to cases or controversies. No rule-making jurisdiction is specified. 
In contrast, under Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court is 
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specifically given judicial rule-making powers.13 Consequently, the issue of what necessary 
disbursements should be awarded under its own Rule 54(d), is a question that should not be left 
entirely to the legislature. 
Finally, die FrarrptonnAe needs to be reversed or modified in light of the Open Court's 
clause in Utah's Constitution. Plainly, "every person, for an injury done to him" cannot "have 
a remedy by due course of law" in an open court if the court refuses to award "necessary 
disbursements" to a prevailing party, but instead limits recoverable costs to those conservatively 
specified by the legislature. 
D. The Juiy Awards on Dr. Jens en's Gathering of Information Claims arc Not 
Duplicative 
As set forth earlier, the common-law intrusion claim protects a person from a highly 
offensive intrusion upon his solitude or seclusion. The jury received ample evidence supporting 
the jury's award on the common-law intrusion claim. In addition, the legislature has provided 
for a statutory privacy claim under § 76-9-401 et seq. In doing so, the legislature provided three 
claims for recovery and separated them. It is evident from the verdict, that the jury also viewed 
claims as separate and distinct by virtue of the fact that the jury did not award damages under 
§ 76-9-402(1) (c),. The juiy found that the Media Defendants trespassed on property with intent 
to subject Dr. Jensen to eavesdropping or surveillance. The jury also found that the Media 
Defendants installed a hidden camera without Dr. Jensen's consent. The trespass violated § 76-
9-402(1) (a) and the installation violated § 76-9-402(1) (b). In summary, the structure and content 
of the statute shows that the common-law intrusion claim is separate and distinct from the 
separate statutory privacy claims. Consequently, the jury, by awarding damages under each of 
13The legislature can overturn or amend a Supreme Court rule by a 2/3 vote. Utah Const. 
Art. VIII § 4. 
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the claims, did not award a duplicate recovery. 
VIIL CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered in favor of Dr. Jensen should be 
upheld and the remittitur entered on the gathering of information claims should be reversed. 
Dr. Jensen should be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees on all of his claims as well as a 
judgment for necessary disbursements. 
Dated this / day of Judb, 2003. 
DALE F. GARDINER 
DOUGLAS J. PARRY 
CRAIG KKLEINMAN 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 
1. Dr. Jensen "Story Idea" composed by Geoff Roth (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 25). 
2. Video of KTVX Channel 4 News Broadcasts (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 19, 20 & 21). 
a. September 5,1995 "Diet Doctor." 
b. June 17,1996 "The State is Going after Dr. Jensen's License." 
c. November 6,1996 "Questionable Doctors." 
3. Mary Sawyers Physical Exam Form (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 30). 
4. Copy of Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Copy of Article VIII, § 4, Constitution of Utah. 
6. Controlled Substance Rules for DOPL (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 16). 
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169 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 54 
referee to render decision or enter judgment on as terminating reference, 71 A.LR.4th 889. 
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d What are "exceptional conditions* justifying 
1079. reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 1 
Referee's failure to file report within time A.L.R. Fed. 922. 
specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
PART VH. JUDGMENT 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and 
any order from which an appeal Ues. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and lor involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by 
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief 
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several 
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in 
kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for 
judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made 
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, 
however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the 
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state 
of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted 
by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days 
after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs 
are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum 
thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs 
taxed by the court in which the judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of 
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as 
served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
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(d)(3) Peleted.] 
(d)(4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include 
in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the 
time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. 
The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, 
in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in 
a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation 
thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (dX3) 
and (dX4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, 
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P. 
This rule is similar to Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
Absence of express determination. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Appeal as of right. 
Certification not determinative. 
Costs. 
—In general. 
—Challenge of award. 
—Depositions. 
—Discretionary. 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
—Extension of time for filing. 
—Failure to object. 
—Liability of state. 
—Mediation. 
—Service on adverse party. 
—Statutory limits. 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
—When not demanded. 
Default judgments. 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
Final order. 
—Appealability. 
—Attorney's fee award. 
—Certification, 
—Claims for relief. 
—Complete disposal of claim or party. 
—Effect of counterclaim. 
—No just reason for delay. 
—Review of finality. 
—Separate claims. 
Inconsistent oral statements. 
Interest on judgment. 
Judgment based on impleaded theory. 
Judgment in favor of nonparty. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Pleading in the alternative. 
Presumption of finality. 
Real party in interest. 
Relief not demanded in pleadings. 
Specific performance request. 
Statute of limitations. 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent. 
Cited. 
Absence of express determination. 
In action based on alleged breach of loan 
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-
tion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P. 40(b). 
State, payment of costs awarded against, 
§ 78-27-13. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, 
U.R.C.P. 62(h). 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 78-46-30. 
agreement, where trial court improperly dis-
missed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with 
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judg-
ment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
ment on cross-claim and counterclaim would be 
subject, on remand, to revision since all claims 
presented had not been adjudicated and since 
trial court made no express determination as 
required by this section. M & S Constr. & Eng'g 
Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 2d 139, 
467 P.2d 410 (1970). 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Under Rule 15(b) and Subdivision (c)(1) of 
this rule, amendments should be allowed if a 
case has actually been tried on a different issue 
or a different theory than had been pleaded. 
First Sec. Bank v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 
859 (Utah 1979). 
Appeal as of right. 
Where the requirements of this rule concern-
ing appeal of orders in multi-party or multi-
claim actions are satisfied, the parties are en-
titled to appeal such orders as a matter of right, 
and the Supreme Court does not have discre-
tion to refuse to review the orders. Pate v. 
Marathon Steel Co., 692 R2d 765 (Utah 1984). 
After a party or parties have availed them-
selves of the provisions of Subdivision (b), al-
lowing an entry of judgment on "fewer than all 
of the claims or parties," an appeal may be had 
on the adjudicated claims or by those parties. 
All Weather Insulation, Inc., v. Amiron Dev. 
Corp., 702 P;2d 1176 (Utah 1985). 
Certification not determinative. 
This rule does not necessarily mean there is a 
final judgment merely because the court's order 
so recites; there was in fact no final judgment 
where the trial court denied defendant's motion 
to dismiss, thus leaving the parties in court, 
then entered an order that the denial was a 
final judgment. Little v. Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 
(Utah 1979). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Costs. 
—In general. 
Costs were not recoverable at common law 
and are therefore generally allowable only in 
the amounts and in the manner provided by 
statute. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 
(Utah 1980). 
"Costs," as used in Subdivision (dXD, means 
those fees which are required to be paid to the 
court and to witnesses, and which the statutes 
authorize to be included in the judgment. 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
Subdivision (dX2) provides a process of re-
view by a trial court of the amount claimed to 
be a party's costs, not a process for appeal of the 
award. State ex rel. State Dep't of Social Servs. 
v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
—Challenge of award. 
If a memorandum of costs is filed before 
judgment and costs in specific amounts are 
awarded in that judgment, then a party dissat-
isfied with those costs may have the right of 
moving to alter or amend the costs in the 
judgment under Rule 59(a)(3), enjoying thereby 
the time period often days to do so rather than 
the more restricted period of seven days under 
Subdivision (dX2) of this rule. Nelson v. 
Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). 
Because a challenge to the amount of litiga-
tion expenses awarded is similar to a challenge 
to the amount of attorney fees awarded or the 
amount of costs awarded under Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(d), the court reviews such awards under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Campbell v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 432 
Utah Adv. Rep. 44, — P.3d —, cert, granted, — 
U.S. —, 122 S. Ct. 2326, 153 L. Ed. 2d 158 
(2002). 
—Depositions. 
Where depositions were taken but witnesses 
then testified at trial, costs of the depositions 
were not properly includable within the cost 
bill.'Hull v. Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 
245 (1955). 
Expenses of taking depositions of defendants 
and general contractor in materialman's action 
under § 14-2-2 were assessable as costs where 
necessary to protect plaintiff's rights. Lawson 
Supply Co. v. General Plumbing & Heating Co., 
27 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972). 
Defendant was not entitled to the cost of 
taking depositions where the depositions were 
not used at trial and there was no evidence 
presented that they were necessarily incurred 
for the preparation of defendant's case. Nelson 
v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). 
Costs of depositions are taxable subject to the 
limitation that the trial court is persuaded that 
they were taken in good faith and, in light of 
the circumstances, appeared to be essential for 
the development and presentation of the case; 
deposition costs should be allowable as neces-
sary and reasonable where the development of 
the case is of such a complex nature that 
discovery cannot be accomplished through the 
less expensive methods of interrogatories, re-
quests for admissions and requests for the 
production of documents. Highland Constr. Co. 
v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
The party claiming entitlement to the costs of 
depositions has the burden of demonstrating 
that the depositions were reasonably neces-
sary; determining whether that burden is met 
is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktg., Ltd., 
753 R2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Trial court's conclusory statement that depo-
sition costs were "reasonable and necessary" 
was not sufficient to allow determination on 
appeal of the basis for the court's determina-
tion; therefore the issue was remanded to the 
trial court to determine whether the costs were 
"necessary and reasonable" to the development 
of defendant's case and, if so, to state the basis 
for its decision to include the deposition costs in 
its award of costs. Anderson v. Sharp, 899 P.2d 
1245 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
—Discretionary. 
Subdivision (d) leaves the question of costs 
somewhat in the discretion of the courts. Hull v. 
Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245 (1955). 
The trial court can exercise reasonable dis-
cretion in regard to the allowance of costs, but 
has a duty to guard against any excesses or 
abuses in the taxing thereof. Frampton v. Wil-
son, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980); Hatanaka v. 
Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
In modification of divorce decrees under the 
continuing jurisdiction of the trial court, the 
question of the ability or inability of a party to 
pay costs is a factual matter that lies in the 
discretion of the trial court. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 
P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Trial court had discretion to award deposi-
tion and photocopying costs even though such 
costs were not provided for in this rule, as doing 
so was consistent with the terms of the dis-
puted contract. Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 
404, 38 P.3d 1001. 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
In a habeas corpus proceeding by parents 
against a child-placement agency to obtain cus-
tody of a child, expense items incurred by the 
agency in the taking of depositions and secur-
ing certified copies of a marriage license and 
divorce decree in preparing for the action ap-
peared to be reasonable and incurred in good 
faith, and these costs should have been allowed 
to the prevailing agency as a matter of course. 
Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 12 Utah 2d 235, 
364 P.2d 1029 (1961), overruled on other 
grounds, Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 681 R2d 
199 (Utah 1984). 
The trial court did not err in not awarding 
the <x>sts incurred by a wife in a divorce action 
who, after the suit was filed, secured the ser-
vices of an appraiser who was able to testify at 
length about his opinion of the identity, nature 
and net value of the marital estate after his 
inspection of various property and documents. 
His research and preparation, although essen-
tial to the presentation of the case, could not be 
considered a "cost." Stevens v. Stevens, 754 R2d 
952 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Extension of time for filing. 
Where, in spite of diligent efforts, a party did 
not learn of the entry of judgment until more 
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than five days after it was entered, an exten-
sion of time for filing a motion for costs was 
warranted. Board of Comm'rs of State Bar v. 
Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997). 
—Failure to object. 
Defendant waived any error as to the costs 
allowed the plaintiff where defendant waited 
23 days after filing of cost bill before filing any 
objection. Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 
847 (Utah 1978). 
—Liability of state. 
The general terms of a statute giving costs to 
the prevailing party do not include the state. 
Tracy v. Peterson, 1 Utah 2d 213, 265 R2d 393 
(1954). 
The state is not liable for costs unless there is 
some statute or rule of court which expressly or 
by clear implication includes it. Section 78-
27-13 does not authorize the taxation of costs 
against the state but only provides the source 
from which such costs shall be paid when 
authorized. Tracy v. Peterson, 1 Utah 2d 213, 
265 P.2d 393 (1954). 
The Uniform Act on Paternity, Chapter 45a of 
Title 78, makes no provision for an award of 
costs against the state. State ex rel. State Dep't 
of Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
A fire protection district is not an agency of 
the state and, therefore, costs may be awarded 
against it. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 
616. 
—Mediation. 
Where the defendant did not convince the 
court that the expenses incurred during medi-
ation were unreasonable or were not "necessar-
ily incurred," the court did not exceed its per-
mitted range of discretion in making an award 
for such costs. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508. 
—Service on adverse party. 
This rule requires that only one verified copy 
be served and it is to be served to the court; 
there is no requirement that the copy served 
upon the party from whom costs are claimed be 
verified. Barton v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 380 
P.2d 926 (1963). 
—Statutory limits. 
Award of costs in excess of those expressly 
allowed by statute for service of subpoena, 
witness fees and preparation of model, photo-
graphs and certified copies of documents was 
improper even though the costs represented the 
actual expenses incurred; fact that Supreme 
Court has on occasion approved taxing of ex-
pense of depositions as costs should not be 
taken as opening the door to other expenses of 
the character claimed in the instant case. 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
Witness fees, travel expenses, and service of 
process expenses are chargeable only in accor-
dance with the fee schedule set by statute. 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Witness compensation in excess of the statu-
tory schedule is generally inappropriate as a 
cost. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
Although plaintiff filed an unverified memo-
randum of costs within five days after entry of 
judgment, because he did not file a verified 
memorandum of costs until after the five-day 
period, plaintiff was not entitled to an award of 
costs. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. New York 
Term. Whse. Co., 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 P.2d 626 
(1960). 
Plaintiffs who were contractually entitled to 
attorney fees, costs, and expenses, and applied 
for them five weeks after judgment in their 
favor, were not barred from receiving an award 
of such fees by Subdivision (dX2) because the 
rule does not apply to expenses or attorney fees. 
Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d 
160 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). 
Failure of defendants to file a verified mem-
orandum of costs within five days of the judg-
ment required that an award of costs be deleted 
from the judgment. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
The requirement that a verified memoran-
dum of costs be filed within five days after the 
entry of judgment is mandatory and leaves no 
discretion to the court. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 
19, 5 P.3d 616. 
—When not demanded. 
Fact that plaintiff did not ask for attorney 
fees in his complaint did not preclude trial 
court from awarding them to him since this rule 
indicates that there shall be liberality of proce-
dure to reach result which justice requires. 
Palombi v. D & C Bldrs., 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 
P.2d 325 (1969). 
District court's award p/v attorney fees in 
excess of the fees demanded, in the complaint 
and of costs where no costs were demanded was 
proper where the proof at trial showed the 
party was entitled to such relief. Pope v. Pope, 
589 R2d 752 (Utah 1978). 
Default judgments. 
Subdivision (cX2) and Rule 55 prescribes the 
procedure to be followed by trial courts in 
entering judgments against defaulting parties, 
and courts are not at liberty to deviate from 
those rules just because one party is in default 
and is not entitled to be heard on the merits of 
the case. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 
(Utah 1984). 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
The entry of a final judgment as to fewer than 
all of the parties or claims does not affect the 
ability of the district court to proceed with 
respect to the remainder of the claims and 
parties; and when an appeal is taken from such 
a judgment, it only brings before the Supreme 
Court that portion of the action with respect to 
which the judgment has been entered, and the 
rest of the action remains in the trial court and 
is not necessarily affected by the appeal. Lane 
v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1984). 
Final order. 
—Appealability. 
The final judgment rule, Subdivision (b), ap-
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plies when the trial court orders a separate 
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, ()r 
third-party claim, and failure to have the ca^e 
certified as final by the trial court, leaving 
issues and parties before that court, will de-
prive the appellate court of jurisdiction over *n 
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 208 
(Utah 1991). 
Appeal of an order that was not final atfd 
neither certified nor eligible for certificati^ 
under Subdivision (b) was not properly take£» 
and the remedy was dismissal of the appeal-
A. J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 
323 (Utah 1991). 
Defendants, who did not seek permission to 
file an interlocutory appeal under Rule 5 of tfre 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and wfco 
had, because no final judgment had been en-
tered in the cases, alternative avenues under 
Rules 54(b) and 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure for bringing their claims befofe 
the appellate courts, were not entitled to appeal 
as a matter of right. Tyler v. Department of 
Human Servs., 874 P2d 119 (Utah 1994). 
Judgment as to plaintiff and one defendant 
was not final, and thus not appealable, whefe 
claims against second defendant remained 
pending even though automatic stay for bank-
ruptcy proceeding temporarily protected hi*11 
from having to defend the litigation in state 
court. Donohue v. Mouille, 913 P.2d 776 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
Where plaintiff had appealed a 1993 trial 
court order declaring the summary judgment 
against hiim final, but did not file notice of 
appeal from the 1995 trial court order certify-
ing the case after a temporary remand, tfte 
appeals court still had jurisdiction to hear tfce 
case because the trial court clearly intended to 
certify the 1993 order under Rule 54(b), but 
failed to incorporslt^'its terminology and tfte 
temporary remand to remedy its minor techni-
cal error resulting in the 1995 order acted as 0& 
order nunc pro tunc, relating back to the 1993 
order. Don Houston, M.D., Inc. v. IntermouO-
tain Health Care, Inc., 933 R2d 403 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Juvenile courts dismissal of a motion to s W 
an adjudication of child neglect was not 0& 
order or judgment eligible for certification u^-
der Subdivision (b), and the facts did not au-
thorize treatment of the appeal as a petition for 
permission to appeal an interlocutory order 
under Utah R. App. P., Rule 5. B.W. v. State, 950 
P.2d 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Section 78-31a-19 allows a party to seek 
review of any order denying a motion to compel 
arbitration, regardless of whether the order is a 
final judgment or has otherwise been desig-
xuated. *& foal Vss tk<fc distort, cavvxi \xssiftT tbi& 
rule. Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 982 P.2d 
572. 
Orders and judgments that are not final can 
be appealed only if such appeals are statutorily 
permissible, if the appellate court grants per-
mission under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, or if the trial court ex-
pressly certifies them as final for purposes of 
appeal under Subdivision (b) of the this rule. 
Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 397 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7. 
—Attorney's fee award. 
Because a trial court's initial attorney's fee 
determination in a class action was not a final 
order, it was subject to revision by the same 
judge who entered it until a final judgment was 
handed down. Therefore, the law-of-the-case 
doctrine was not offended by the trial court's 
revision of its earlier order. Plumb v. State, 809 
P2d 734 (Utah 1990). 
—Certification. 
Failure to have an order certified for appeal 
under Rule 54(b) deprives appellate courts of 
jurisdiction over the appeal. Donohue v. 
Mouille, 913 R2d 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
In a quiet title action, where the facts sup-
porting the defendant railroad company's claim 
of ownership of a parcel of land and the legal 
theories supporting its claim did not overlap 
but where the separate facts all related to a 
single land ownership claim, the Supreme 
Court could not certify partial summary judg-
ment under Subdivision (b) because the action 
did not involve multiple claims for relief. 
Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 
1997). 
A court order was properly certified after 
summary judgment was granted for all claims 
against a deceased's estate and the court made 
the required finding that there was no just 
reason for delay and expressly ordered the 
UT App 245, 988 P.2d 1, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 
1271 (Utah 2000). 
—Claims for relief. 
Where liability has been decided but the 
extent of damage remains undetermined, there 
is no final order for purposes of appellate' re-
view. This is also the case where the trial 
court's order disposes of a request for declara-
tory and injunctive relief but leaves unresolved 
other equitable and legal claims for relief. 
Olson v. Salt Lake City Sen. Dist., 724 P.2d 960 
(Utah 1986). 
—Complete disposal of claim or party. 
An order that does not wholly dispose of a 
claim or a party is not "final" and will not be 
appealable. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 
P.2d 765 (Utah 1984); Backstrom Family Ltd. 
Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Summary judgment that did not dispose of 
all claims of all parties in a consolidated case, 
and had not been certified as a final judgment 
pursuant to Subdivision (b), was not a final 
judgment for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. 
Steck v. Aagaire, 789 P.2d 708 (Utah 1990); 
Sneddon v. Graham, 821 R2d 1185 (Utah Ct. 
Aw. 199U> cect. dsoisd, %4A P M 516 (JJtah. 
1992). 
Partial summary judgment granted on one of 
plaintiff'8 three alleged causes of action was not 
eligible for certification under this rule, be-
cause the remaining causes of action in plain-
tiff's complaint were based upon the same 
operative facts as those disposed of by the trial 
court's grant of partial summary judgment. 
Furniture Distrib. Ctr. v. Miles, 821 P.2d 1165 
(Utah 1991). 
Because only part of the claims were resolved 
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by a trial court's ruling, and the question of the 
remedy remained to be determined, the sum-
mary judgment ruling failed to dispose com-
pletely of either a claim or a party as required 
by Subdivision (b) of this rule. American Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Gibson, 839 P.2d 797 (Utah 1992). 
—Effect of counterclaim. 
Because a counterclaim was still pending 
before the trial court, a summary judgment 
that dismissed each cause of action in the 
complaint with prejudice was not a final, ap-
pealable order. U.P.C., Inc. v. R.OA. General, 
Inc., 1999 UT App 303, 990 P.2d 945. 
—No just reason for delay. 
Pursuant to the requirement in Subdivision 
(b) that the trial court "may direct the entry of 
a final judgment ... only upon an express de-
termination by the court that there is no just 
reason for delay" and, because this determina-
tion by the trial court is subject to judicial 
review under an abuse of discretion standard, a 
brief explanation should accompany all future 
certifications so that the appellate court may 
render an informed decision on that question. 
Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 
1992). 
—Review of finality. 
The initial question of whether an order is 
eligible for certification under Subdivision (b), 
i.e., whether the order is "final," is a question of 
law. Therefore, the appellate court will review 
the trial court's decision on this point for cor-
rectness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
814 P.2d 1099 (1991). 
There are three requirements under Subdivi-
sion (b) for a party seeking certification of 
finality of an order: First, there must be multi-
ple claims for relief or multiple parties to the 
action; second, the judgment appealed from 
must have been entered on an order that would 
be appealable but for the fact that other claims 
or parties remain in the action; third, the trial 
court, in its discretion, must make a determi-
nation that there is no just reason for delaying 
the appeal. Donohue v. Mouille, 913 P.2d 776 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
—Separate claims. 
When the degree of factual overlap between 
the issue certified for appeal and the issues 
remaining in the trial court is such that sepa-
rate claims appear to be based on the same 
operative facts or on the same operative facts 
with minor variations, they are not separate 
claims for purposes of Subdivision (b). 
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 
1099 (1991); FMA Leasing Co. v. Citizens Bank, 
823 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1992). 
To be eligible as an appealable order under 
Subdivision (b), the court's ruling must dispose 
of a "separate claim." A "separate claim" must 
arise from different facts than those underlying 
the remaining causes of action. Webb v. Van-
tage Income Properties, 818 P.2d 1 (1991); Don-
ohue v. Mouille, 913 P.2d 776 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Plaintiff's alleged three causes of action, all 
of which arose out of the same set of operative 
facts, constituted only one "claim" for purposes 
of this rule. Furniture Distrib. Ctr. v. Miles, 821 
P.2d 1165 (Utah 1991). 
A claim is not separate if a decision on claims 
remaining in the trial court would render moot 
the issues on appeal. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 
826 P2d 137 (Utah 1992). 
Pursuant to the requirement of U.R.C.P. 
52(a) that the trial court "find the facts spe-
cially," in order to facilitate appellate review of 
a judgment certified as final under Subdivision 
(b) of this rule, the trial court should enter 
findings supporting its determination that such 
an order is final and the findings should explain 
the lack of factual overlap between the certified 
and remaining claims. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 
826 R2d 137 (Utah 1992). 
Inconsistent oral statements. 
Oral statements of opinion by the trial court 
inconsistent with the findings and conclusions 
ultimately rendered do not affect the final judg-
ment. McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 
R2d 468 (1952). 
Interest on judgment. 
Interest follows a judgment as a matter of 
law and is collectible even though the clerk of 
court fails to include the same in the judgment 
signed by him. Dairy Distribs., Inc. v. Local 976, 
Western Conference of Teamsters, 16 Utah 2d 
85, 396 P.2d 47 (1964). 
In an action on an oral contract, a party's 
failure to specifically plead a request for pre-
judgment interest was of no consequence be-
cause the interest issue is injected by law into 
every action for the payment of past due money. 
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 R2d 301 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
When a judgment is reversed on appeal, the 
new judgment subsequently entered by the 
trial court may bear interest enly from the date 
of entry of that new judgment. Mason v. West-
ern Mtg. Loan Corp., 754 P2d 984 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Judgment based on unpleaded theory. 
Where plaintiff alleged only an express con-
tract and he sought no amendment of his plead-
ings nor offered any proof to establish a quan-
tum meruit theory, court erred in granting 
judgment for plaintiff based on the theory of 
quantum meruit. Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 1 
Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279 (1953). 
Although a complaint may sound in contract, 
it is not prejudicial error for a court to allow 
recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, where 
defendant was not denied a fair opportunity to 
meet the change in theory of recovery. PLC 
Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish 'n Chips, 
Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 R2d 562 (1972). 
Complaint for foreclosure of a hen was defec-
tive because of the nature of relief sought even 
though it did not demand judgment for per-
sonal liability on contract and judgment was 
granted for such personal liability, since this 
rule provides that a judgment shall grant the 
relief to which a party is entitled even though it 
is not demanded. Motivated Mgt. Intfl v. 
Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979). 
In a dispute over the appropriation of assets 
and goodwill of a business corporation, it was 
error for trial court to liquidate assets of the 
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corporation where the issues upon which such 
action rested were neither pleaded nor raised 
by parties, nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Family 
Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 R2d 733 (Utah 1984). 
Judgment in favor of nonparty. 
Subdivision (cXD is consistent with the gen-
eral principle that a trial court may not render 
judgment in favor of a nonparty. Courts can 
generally make a legally binding adjudication 
only between the parties actually joined in the 
action. Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 R2d 1024 (Utah 
1987). 
Subdivision (cXD cannot dispense entirely 
with the necessity that a claimant make some 
claim in the lawsuit against the defendant. 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 R2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
A court may not grant relief to a nonparty. 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Judgment creditors who participated as par-
ties in a lien case could not recover in a sepa-
rate fraudulent conveyance case, where they 
had not moved to intervene and were never 
parties in the separate case. Butler v. Wilkin-
son, 740 R2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Motion to reconsider. 
Although a motion to reconsider is not ex-
pressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Subdivision (b) does allow by impli-
cation for the possibility of a judge's changing 
his or her mind in cases involving multiple 
parties or multiple claims. Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
When summary judgment had been granted 
on some issues but a final judgment in the case 
had not been entered, the summary judgment 
was "subject to revision" under Subdivision (b); 
a motion to reconsider WQS a reasonable means 
of requesting such a revision and was therefore 
permitted. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 
(Utah 1993). 
The law of the case doctrine did not preclude 
the trial court from revisiting a prior ruling on 
a summary judgment motion. Trembly v. Mrs. 
Fields Cookies, 884 P2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
It was within the trial court's discretion to 
reconsider, under Subdivision (b), its denial of 
summary judgment, basing its reconsideration 
on cases, decided after the original denial, that 
presented the case in a different light because 
of factual similarities. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 R2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Pleading in the alternative. 
In action by architect against owners for 
value of his services, the alternate remedies of 
an action on the contract ox in quasi contract 
under the theory of quantum meruit could be 
pleaded in alternative form and inserted by 
amendment late in the proceedings. Parrish v. 
Tfchtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P.2d 642 (1957). 
Presumption of finality. 
Subdivision (b) allows courts to readjust prior 
rulings in complex cases as subsequent devel-
opments in the case might require, unless those 
rulings disposed of entire claims or parties and 
those rulings were specifically certified as final. 
The "law of the case" doctrine nonetheless pro-
motes a measure of predictability in such cases 
by creating a kind of presumption that the 
court's prior rulings, even if not certified as 
final, were correct and should stand. Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 
42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Real party in interest. 
Where surety's pleadings in action on bond 
stated that it deemed plaintiffs partial assign-
ment of right of action on bond as a breach of 
contract releasing its liability, plaintiff had 
sufficient notice and surety was entitled to 
show that plaintiff was not real party in inter-
est as a result of the assignment even though 
this specific defense was not pleaded. Pruden-
tial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Accident 
& Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 R2d 899 
(1958). 
Relief not demanded in pleadings. 
Where plaintiff's prayer for relief does not 
include punitive damages but he adduces the 
necessary requirements for such damages at 
trial, he can claim punitive damages under 
Subdivision (c) without a formal amendment to 
the pleadings. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 
675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings. However, although 
Subdivision (cXD permits relief on grounds not 
pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to 
authorize the granting of relief on issues nei-
ther raised nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Family 
Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984); 
Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 R2d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 
287 (Utah 1984). 
In consonance with Subdivision (cXD, it 
would have been proper for the court to have 
reformed the contract if a mutual mistake of 
fact had been established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence even though the issue of mutual 
mistake was not raised and such relief was not 
demanded by the pleadings. Mabey v. Kay 
Peterson Constr. Co., 682 R2d 287 (Utah 1984); 
Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 956 
(Utah 1987). 
Subdivision (cXD requires trial courts to be 
liberal in awarding appropriate relief justified 
by the facts developed at trial, as long as failure 
to request a particular form of relief does not 
prejudice a party in the preparation or trial of 
the case. If there is no prejudice, it is necessary 
only that the relief granted be supported by the 
evidence and be a permissible form of relief for 
the claims litigated. Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 
757 R2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The rule laid down in Mabey v. Kay Peterson 
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984), i.e., that 
Subdivision (cXD allows a court to reform a 
document if a mutual mistake is established, 
even if the issue of mutual mistake was not 
raised and reformation was not demanded in 
the pleadings, also applies when the mistake is 
Rule 54 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 176 
unilateral and reformation is appropriate. 
Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1989). 
Specific performance request 
In action on real estate contract calling for 
paying of purchase price in installments, plain-
tiff's prayer for specific performance was con-
strued as request for judgment for installments 
in arrears and attorneys' fees. Woodard v. Allen, 
1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953). 
Statute of limitations. 
A provision of a divorce decree i^uir ing the 
defendant to execute and deliver appropriate 
instruments to transfer an interest in a corpo-
ration to the plaintiff created a judgment in 
plaintiff's favor, making her action for enforce-
ment subject to an eight-year statute of limita-
tions. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 1999 UT App 
130, 977 P.2d 1226. 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent. 
Where an issue is raised at trial without 
objection by the nonraising party, where both 
sides, present evidence on the issue, and where 
there is no evidence that the nonraising party 
was surprised or misled by the introduction of 
the issue, the fact that such issue was not 
raised in the pleadings or on a motion to amend 
does not vitiate a finding on such issue. 
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226,310 
P.2d 517 (1957). 
Where defendants did not plead subsequent 
agreement as an affirmative defense to action 
on prior agreement, and although plaintiff ob-
jected to evidence on issue of subsequent agree-
ment, when it was overruled, he made no 
request for a continuance nor did he make any 
representation to the court that he was taken 
by surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage in 
meeting that issue, trial court properly allowed 
issue to be raised and properly received con-
tract in evidence. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 
205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963). 
Cited in Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 545,236 
P.2d 451,26 AJL.R.2d 947 (1951); Leger Constr., 
Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976); 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 
(Utah 1979); South Shores Concession, Inc. v. 
State, 600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979); Myers v. 
Morgan, 626 P.2d 410 (Utah 1981); Bernard v. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple 
Claims Under Rule 54(b): A Time for Reexami-
nation?, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 327. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — The 
Hecovery of Attorney "Fees in Utah: A Proce-
dural Primer for Practitioners, 23 J. Contemp. 
L. 379 (1997). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate 
Review §§ 909, 928; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 11 
to 13, 19 to 21, 27 to 43; 46 Am. Jur. 2d 
Judgments § 1. 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 49 C.J.S. 
Judgments § 1. 
A.L.R. — Effect on compensation of architect 
or building contractor of express provision in 
private building contract limiting the cost of 
Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981); Bailey v. 
Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984); 
GMAC v. Martinez, 712 P.2d 243 (Utah 1986); 
Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806 (Utah 1986); 
Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 1986); 
lebbs, Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks, 735 R2d 1305 
(Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986); Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 
614 (Utah 1987); Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631 
(Utah 1987); Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320 
(Utah 1987); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 
(Utah 1987); Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 
p.2d 186 (Utah 1987); McKee v. Williams, 741 
f.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Galloway v. 
Mangum, 744 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1987); Davies v. 
Olson, 746 R2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Kathy's Food Stores, Inc. v. Equitable Life & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 753 P.2d 501 (Utah 1988); Wil-
liams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 
1988); OK Motors, Inc. v. Hill, 762 P.2d 1102 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Redevelopment Agency v. 
paskalas, 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); City Consumer Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 
p.2d 234 (Utah 1991); Cornish Town v. Roller, 
017 P.2d 305 (Utah 1991); Town of Manila v. 
Broadbent Land Co., 818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991); 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); Quinn v. Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., m ?.2d fcofc 03tah lSOfty, Watson v. Vfal-
*on, 837 R2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); J.H. ex 
fel. D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 
1992); Ledfors v. Emery County Sen. Dist., 849 
P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Ong Intl (U.S A ) , Inc. v. 
11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993); 
Shaw v. Layton Constr. Co., 854 P.2d 1033 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Brumley v. Utah State 
lax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 1994); TS 1 
Partnership v. Allred, 877 <B2d 156 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah 1997); Arredondo v. Avis 
Rent A Car Sys., 2001 UT 29, 24 P.3d 928; 
Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 
43,23 P.3d 1043; UTCO Assocs. v. Zimmerman, 
2001 UT App 117, 27 P.3d 177, cert, denied, 32 
p.3d 249 (Utah 2001); Beaver County v. Qwest, 
Inc., 2001 UT 81, 31 P.3d 1147; Ault v. Holden, 
2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781; Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 48 
P.3d 968. 
the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778. 
Recoverability under property insurance or 
insurance against liability for property damage 
of insured's expenses to prevent or mitigate 
damages, 33 A.L.Tt.3d 1262. 
Dismissal of plaintiff's action as entitling 
defendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as 
"prevailing party" or "successful party," 66 
AL.R.3d 1087. 
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing 
party" for purposes of awarding costs where 
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66 
AL.R.3d 1115. 
Continuance of civil case as conditioned upon 
applicant's payment of costs or expenses in-
curred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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Running of interest on judgment where both Obduracy as basis for state-court award of 
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099. attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
Allocation of defense costs between primary Attorney's personal liability for expenses in* 
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th curred in relation to services for client, 66 
107. A.L.R.4th 256. 
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or Modern status of state court rules governing 
other sanctions against attorney who fails to entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80 
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial, 29 A.L.R.4th 707. 
AX.R.4th 160. Recoverability of cost of computerized legal 
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d), 
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 
Retrospective application and effect of state 168. 
statute or rule allowing interest or changing Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure 
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41 Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on 
A.L.R.4th 694. multiple claims, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514. 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and 
that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter 
judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the defendant if: 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); 
and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum 
that can be made certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by 
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter 
judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to 
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by 
evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may 
conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and 
proper. 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counter claimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule 
apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a 
third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. 
In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by 
default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by 
evidence satisfactory to the court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; November 1, 2002.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend- 4(dXl)" for "served otherwise than by publica-
ment deleted former Subdivision (a)(2), relat- tion or by personal service outside of this state"; 
ing to notice to a party in default; in Subdivi- and made related and stylistic changes, 
sion (bXD, substituted "amount claimed" for Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
"amount due" and "served pursuant to Rule Rule 55, F.R.C.R 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Damages. Judgment. 
Divorce action. —Conduct of counsel. 
Entry of default not warranted. —Default entry necessary. 
Failure to plead. —Failure to follow rule. 
Appendix 5 
Art. V m , § 4 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
are presumed to be proper unless there is no 
substantial evidence to sustain them. Schad v. 
Turner, 27 Utah 2d 345, 496 P.2d 263 (1972); 
Wilson v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 368, 496 P.2d 
711 (1972); Leggroan v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 
403, 497 P.2d 17 (1972); Zumbrunnen v. 
Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 P.2d 34 (1972). 
Legislative enlargement or abridgement of 
powers. 
The powers given court by this provision 
cannot be enlarged or abridged by the legisla-
ture. State ex rel. Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah 
93, 104 P. 760 (1908). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Judi-
cial Socialization: An Empirical Study, 11 J. 
Contemp. L. 423 (1985). 
Key Numbers. — Courts *=> 248. 
Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges 
pro tempore — Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used 
in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme 
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tem-
pore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the 
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The 
Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission 
to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — Former Article VHI 
contained no comparable provisions. 
Cross-References. •— Supreme Court rule-
making process, Rule 11-101, Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Judge pro tempore. 
Regulation of judicial conduct. 
Regulation of practice of law. 
Cited. 
Judge pro tempore. 
Appointment of a judge pro tempore to hear 
and decide a divorce action does not violate the 
provisions of § 30-3-4, since a properly ap-
pointed pro tempore judge becomes the equal 
in every respect to the regular judge. Harward 
v. Harward, 526 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1974). 
Circuit judge appointed by state court ad-
ministrator to serve temporarily as a district 
judge pursuant to § 78-3-24 and former 
§ 78-4-15 was not a judge pro tempore and was 
not subject to the legal restrictions pertaining 
to that status. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 
(Utah 1982). 
Regulation of judicial conduct 
The Supreme Court is constitutionally obli-
gated to review the Judicial Conduct Commis-
sion's proceedings, but the court has no author-
ity to undertake initial review of matters re-
lated to compliance with the judicial canons of 
ethics. In re Greenwood, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 
27 (1990). 
Regulation of practice of law. 
This section gives the Supreme Court the 
power to govern the practice of law and to dis-
cipline bar members. This power necessarily 
includes control over the procedures used to 
discipline bar members. In re Crandall, 784 
P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989). 
Cited in Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law ~- Judicial Decisions — Govern-
ment, 1995 Utah L. Rev. i. 
Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law 
unconstitutional — Justice unable to partici-
pate.] 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Death Qualifi-
cation and the Right to an Impartial Jury 
Under the State Constitution: Capital Jury 
Selection in Utah After $tate v. Young, 1995 
Utah L. Rev. 365. 
AXJL — Disqualification of judge for bias 
against counsel for litigant, 54 A.L.R.5th 575. 
Laws governing judicial recusal or disquali-
fication in state proceeding as violating federal 
or state constitution, 91 A.L.R.5th 437. 
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.] 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 
907 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1995). 
Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges 
pro tempore — Regulation of practice of law.] 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Regulation of appellate practice. 
Regulation of practice of law. 
Sentencing procedure. 
Cited. 
Regulation of appellate practice. 
This section authorizes the Supreme Court to 
promulgate rules, such as Utah R. Crim. P. 26, 
that limit appellate review; § 5 of this article 
does not restrict that authority to constitu-
tional and statutory provisions. City of Kanab 
v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Regulation of pract ice of law. 
Only the Utah Supreme Court has rulemak-
ing power over the practice of law and the 
procedures of the Bar. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 
P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992). 
Section 78-21-25, prohibiting the unautho-
rized practice of law, does not encroach on the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
regulate the practice of law as granted by this 
provision, in violation of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine found in Utah. Const., Art. V, § I. 
Board of Comm'rs of State Bar v. Petersen, 937 
R2d 1263 (Utah 1997). 
Because the Supreme Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters, a 
trial court correctly determined that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to vacate an order of 
the Supreme Court disbarring an attorney. 
Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 335 (Utah 1997). 
Sentencing procedure. 
Section 76-3-207 does not violate this consti-
tutional provision, although it was passed with 
less than two-thirds majority vote, since the 
statute was enacted twelve years before this 
provision was added to the constitution. State v. 
Carter, 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995). 
Cited in Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
800 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990); Barnard v. Utah 
State Bar, 804 P.2d 526 (Utah 1991); State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 
982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999); Bailey v, Utah State 
Bar, 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993); Petersen v. 
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148 (Utah 
1995); In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996); 
A.B. v. State, 936 P.2d 1091 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997), cert, granted, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997); 
Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 44 P.3d 
734. 
Art. VIII, § 5 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 50 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. —- Court Rulemaking in rial Derisions — Government, 1995 Utah L. 
Utah Following the 1985 Revision of the Utah Rev. 1. 
Constitution, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 153. Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part HI, 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi- 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683. 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal,] 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS limitation was imposed only by rule and not 
concurrently by statute. City of Kanab v. 
In general. Guskey, 965 R2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Appeal from justice court. 
Educational institution proceedings. Educational institution proceedings. 
Right to appeal. District court correctly determined it did not 
I , have jurisdiction under the Utah Administra-
iLTurpose behind this section is to prevent tive Procedures Act (UAPA) to review college 
the chminkeffect on the constitutional right to parkmg committee s decision upholding fine for 
appeal which the possibility of a harsher sen- f a ^ to h a ™ disabled placard visible while 
tence would have on a defendant who might be P " * * ™ a J * ^ ^ S ^ z o n e - ^ P l a m T l™' 
able to demonstrate reversible error in his * ^ of § 63-46b-l(2Xd) exempts from UAPA 
conviction. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah actions relating to student discipline in any 
1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1036, 112 S. Ct. educational institution and nothing in this sec-
883 116 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1992). ^ o n IPv e s district courts appellate jurisdiction 
This section does not create a constitutional o v e r 8 u c h decisions. Wisden v. Dixie College 
right to judicial review of all state or local Parking Comm., 935 R2d 550 (Utah Ct. App. 
administrative agency rulings; where there is 1997). 
no specific, statutorily prescribed method for
 R . , . . , 
judicial review of an agency action, review is J*. . , / *i '. . . , - , .
 x 
available by extraordinary writ. Department of .™» n * h t «f • "mma! defendant to pursue a 
Envtl. Quality v. Golden Gardens Water Co., **?*?*»* " * * " » * ? ? * ? « n » b t » t ' * » I 
2001 UT ADD 173 27 P3d 579 right, but a defendant who tiled an appeal, then 
personally requested that it be withdrawn, only 
Appeal from justice court. to later file a petition seeking extraordinary 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26, limiting appellate re- relief, bore the burden of proving a constitu-
view of cases originating in the justice courts, tional violation since the prior judgment car-
does not offend this section and effectively ried a presumption of validity, Bruner v. 
limited review during the period when the Carver, 920 P.2d 1153 (Utah 1996). 
Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate 
approval.] 
(1) When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the governor shall fill the 
vacancy by appointment from a Ust of at least three nominees certified to the 
governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having authority over the 
vacancy. The governor shall fill the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the 
Ust of nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy within the time 
prescribed, the chief justice of the Supreme Court shall within 20 days make 
the appointment from the Ust of nominees. 
(2) The Legislature by statute shall provide for the nominating commis-
sions' composition and procedures. No member of the Legislature may serve as 
a member of, nor may the Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial 
Nominating Commission. 
(3) The Senate shall consider and render a decision on each judicial 
appointment within 60 days of the date of appointment. If necessary, the 
Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session for the purpose of 
Appendix 6 
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yj>) The dutiea and reaponaibilities of the committee 
gy include: 
£(D renew report* and other written materials 
tie to the committee with respect to nurses on 
meet with nurses on probation to determine 
progress and compliance with any probationary 
~ Gii) report to the division and board any informs-
~ i which may indicate that a nurse is not in compli-
i with the terms and conditions of probation, or in 
Tjmr other way a threat to the public interest in the 
practice of nursing; and 
j£\ (hr) advise the division and board with respect to 
srany applicants for a license who may be considered 
r for licensure under terms of probation or restriction. 
^ - ( 5 ) Psychiatric Mental Health Nurse Specialist 
* Peer Review Committee. 
" (a) There is hereby created a Psychiatric Mental 
- Health Nurse Specialist Peer Review Committee 
:. which ia advisory to the board which shall be made 
ap of five nurses currently licensed MM a Advanced 
Practice Registered Nurses • Psychiatric Mental 
Health Nurse as follows and the Executive Adminis-
trator of the Board of Nursing as an ex-officio mem-
ber 
(0 two educators/adminiatrators; and 
Cii) three advanced practice registered nurses-psy-
chiatric mental health nurse specialist. 
(b) The chairperson of the committee may act as a 
representative of the committee to the Prescriptive 
Practice Board, but may not be a member of the Pre-
emptive Practice Board. 
(c) The duties and responsibilities of the committee 
may include: 
U) review applications for licensure and make ap-
propriate recommendations to the Board of Nursing 
and division; and 
(ii) review applications for prescriptive authority 
and make appropriate recommendations to the Pre-
scriptive Practice Board and division. 
1993 58-1-6(1), 58-1.6X1), 58-31-4 
R156-37. Controlled Substances Rules 







&156-37-6. Application for License. 
R156-37-7. Waiver of License. 
&156-37-8. Access to Records, Facilities and Inven-
tory. 
R156-37-9. Grounds for Revocation or Denial. 
IU56-37-10. Records. 
R156-37-11. Restrictions Upon the Prescription. Dis-
pensing and Administration of Controlled Sub-
stances. 
R156-37-12. Emergency Verbal Prescription of 
Schedule II Controlled Substances. 
R156-37-13. Disposal of Controlled Substances. 
R156-37-U. Surrender of Suspended or Revoked Li-
R156-37-15. Herbal Products. 
R15647-1. Title. 
These rules shall be known as the "Controlled Sub-
stance Rules of the Division of Occupational and Pro-
fessional Licensing." 
R1S6-37-2. Authority. 
(1) The Executive Director of the Department of 
Commerce has delegated to the Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing all of the Depart-
ment's duties, responsibilities and authority as pro-
vided in Title 58, Chapter 37. 
(2) These rules are promulgated in accordance with 
the provisions of Title 56, Chapters 1 and 37. 
R156-37-3. Purpose. 
The purpose of these rules is to regulate controlled 
substances to prevent their harmful use. Nothing in 
these rules is intended to impose any limitations on a 
physician or other licensed practitioner to administer 
or dispense controlled substances in accordance with 
generally accepted medical practice in this state, to 
maintain or detoxify a person as an incidental ad-
junct to medical or surgical treatment of conditions 
other than addiction, or to administer or prescribe 
narcotic drugs to persons with intractable pain in 
which no other course of treatment or care ia possible 
or none has been found after reasonable efforts. 
R15W7-4. Definitions, 
(1) All definitions set forth in Title 53, Chapters 1, 
17 and 37 shall apply to these rules. 
(2) The following additional definitions shall apply 
to these rules: 
(a) "DEA" means the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration of the United States Department of Justice; 
(b) "Schedule II Controlled Stimulant" means any 
material, compound, mixture, or preparation listed in 
Subsection 56-37-4(2XbXiiD. 
R15647-6. licensing. 
(1) Consistent with provisions of law, the division 
may issue a controlled sohstsnre license to manufac-
ture, produce, distribute, dispense, prescribe, obtain, 
administer, analyze, or conduct research with con-
trolled substances in Schedules III . HI, IV, and/or V 
to qualified persons. Licensee shall be issued to quali-





(e) osteopathic physician; 
(f) physician and surgeon; 
(g) physician assistant; 
(h) veterinarian; 
(i) nurse practitioner, 
(j) naturopath; 
(k) pharmaceutical researcher; 
(i) drug outlets located in the state of Utah licensed 
as a: 
(i) retail pharmacy; 
(ii) hospital pharmacy; 
(iii) institutional pharmacy; 
(iv) pharmaceutical manufocturer, 
(v) pharmaceutical wholesaler/distributor; 
(vi) branch pharmacy; 
(vii) nuclear pharmacy; or 
(viii) veterinary pharmaceutical outlet; 
(m) pharmaceutical dog trainer 
(n) pharmaceutical teaching organisation; 
(o) analytical laboratory; 
(p) state or local agency performing animal eutha-
nasia; and 
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(q) Utah Department of Correction! for the conduct 
of execution by the administration of lethal injection 
under its statutory authority and in accordance with 
its policies and procedures. 
(2) A license may be restricted to the extent deter-
mined by the division, in collaboration with appropri-
ate licensing boards, that such restriction is neces-
sary to protect the public health, safety or welfare, or 
the welfare of the licensee. A person receiving such a 
restricted license shall manufacture, produce, obtain, 
distribute, dispense, prescribe, administer, analyze, 
or conduct research with controlled substances only 
to the extent of the terms and conditions under which 
the restricted license is issued by the division. 
(3) The division shall not issue a controlled sub-
stance license to any person upon a finding that the 
issuance of a license would endanger the public 
health, safety or welfare. 
R156-374. Application for License. 
(1) An applicant for a controlled substance license 
shall submit an application form in content as ap-
proved and tarnished by the division, and shall pay 
the required fee as established by the division under 
the provisions of Subsection 63-39-3(2). 
(2) Any person seeking a controlled substance li-
cense based upon their qualification toted under 
R156-37-5 shall be currently licensed by the state in 
the appropriate professional license classification and 
shall maintain that license classification as current 
at all times while holding a controlled substance li-
cense issued by the state. 
(3) Upon receiving an application for a controlled 
substance license from a qualified person, the divi-
sion may issue the license or may assign the applica-
tion to a qualified and appropriate licensing board for 
review and recommendation to the division with re-
spect to issuance of a license. 
(4) The division or the reviewing board may re-
quest from the applicant all information which is rea-
sonable and necessary to permit an evaluation of the 
applicant's qualifications and the public interest in 
the issuance of a controlled substance license to the 
applicant The division shall have the right to con-
duct site inspections, review research protocol, con-
duct interviews with persons knowledgeable about 
the applicant, and conduct any other investigation 
which is reasonable and necessary to determine the 
suitability of the applicant to receive a controlled 
substance license. 
(5) The division shall not issue a controlled sub-
stance license to any person upon a finding by the 
division that the issuance of the license enabling the 
applicant to engage in authorised activities with con-
trolled substances would or could reasonably be ex-
pected U>pc*MthnMtu>tb*pub)icb*M}th,3Mf0tr, or 
welfare. 
(6) The division may require an applicant to pass 
an examination on the subject of controlled substance 
laws. 
R156-37-7. Waiver of License. 
(1) Individuals employed by an agency of the State 
or any of its political subdivision, who are specifically 
authorized in writing by the state agency or the polit-
ical subdivision to possess specified controlled sub-
stances in specified reasonable and necessary quanti-
ties for the purpose of euthanasia upon animals, shall 
be exempt from having a controlled substance license 
if the agency or jurisdiction employing that individ-
ual has obtained a controlled substance license, s 
DEA registration number, and uses the controlled 
substances according to s written protocol in perform-: 
ing animal euthanaaia 
(2) Law enforcement agencies and their sworn per-
sonnel are exempt from the licensing requirements of j 
the Controlled Substance Act to the extent their offi-i 
cial duties require them to possess controlled tuM 
stances; they act within the scope of their enforce^  1 
ment responsibilities; they mainuin accurate record*"1 
of controlled substances which come into their possesm< 
sion; and they maintain an effective audit trail. Noth-
ing herein shall authorise law enforcement personnel \ 
to purchase or possess controlled substances for ad-; 
ministration to animals unless such purchase or poe-1 
session is in accordance with a duly issued controlled ' 
substance license. _» 
R166-37-& Access to Records, Faculties and IB>~ 
ventory. 
Applicants for licensure and all licensees shall' 
make available for inspection, to the extent they 
exist, during regular business hours and at other rea-
sonable times in the event of an emergency, their 
controlled substance stock or inventory, records re-
quired under the Utah Controlled 8nhstancea Act and 
those rules or under the Federal controlled substance 
laws, and facilities related to activities involving con- . 
tmUtd wtrbttsncM 
R156-37-9. Grounds for Revocation or Denial. 
In addition to the acta and practices enumerated in 
Subsection 58-37-6(4Xa) of the Controlled Substances 
Act, the division may deny issuance of a license or 
may revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation s 
controlled substance license if the applicant or li-
(1) has prescribed to himself or administered to 
himself without prescription issued by another li-
censed practitioner any Schedule D or HI controlled 
substances; 
(2) has violated any federal or state law relating to 
controlled substances; 
(3) prescribed or administered a controlled sub-
stance for a condition he is not licensed to treat or is 
not competent to treat; 
(4) fails to deliver to the division the license certifi-
cate upon an action which revokes, suspends or limits 
the license; 
(5) fails to jwfiwfcafa controls over controlled sub- . 
stances which would be considered by a prudent prac-
titioner to be effective against diversion, theft or 
shortage of controlled substances; 
(6) is unable to account for shortages of controlled 
substances in his inventory; 
(7) violates restrictions upon controlled snhstsnnss, 
proscriptions and administration as contained in 
these rules; and/or 
(3) knowingly prescribes, MMM, give* away. <***' 
ministers, directly or indirectly, or offers to prescribe, 
sell, furnish, give away, or administer any controlled 
substance to a drug dependent person, aa defined in 
Subsection 58-37-2(14), except for legitimate medical 
purposes aa permitted by law. 
Rlfit-37.10. Records. 
(1) Records of purchase, distribution, dispensing, 
prescribing, and administration of controlled sub-
stances shall be kept according to state and federal 
law. Prescribing.practitioners shall keep accurate 
records reflecting the examination, evaluation and 
treatment of all patients. Patient medical records 
shall accurately reflect the prescription or adminis-
tration of controlled substances in the treatment of 
the patient, the purpose for which the controlled tub-
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i i« otilittd aad information upon which thedi-
is if baaed. Practitioners shall kotp records 
from patient records of oach controlled sub-
Lfttace purchased, and with respect to oach controlled 
sauhstanfr, ita disposition, whether by administration 
ifg any other means, date of disposition, to whom 
hjpm. and the quantity given, 
g (2) Any licenaee who experience! any ahortafe or 
D^haft of controlled enhetencee shall inunediately file 
? the appropriaU forms with the Drug Enforcement 
: Administration, with a copy to the division directed 
£_to the attention of the Investigation Bureau. He shall 
^ alto report the incident to the local law enforcement 
? agency. 
r" .(3) All records required by federal and state laws or 
r'rules must be maintained by the licensee for a period 
of five yean. If a licenaee should sell or transfer own* 
~ ership of his files in anyway, those files shall be 
_. maintained separately from other records of the new 
(4) Prescription records may be maintain*! clec-
• tronically so long ac 
(a) the original of each prescription, including tele-
phone proscriptions, is maintained in a physical file 
and contains all of the information required by fed-
eral and state law; and 
(b) there is a physical printout of the controlled 
substances dispensed each day that details the pre-
scription number, the quantity of each drug dis-
pensed, the preecribing practitioner and the dispens-
ing fhrnrmmamL E«A fhmrmmrimt thmt i« i ^ f i i ^ 
on the printout as having dispensed a controlled sub-
stance shall sign his name to the printout, attesting 
to the accuracy of the data detailed, or shall make 
appropriate changes and then sign his name. 
(6) AH records relating to Schedule II controlled 
substances received, purchased, administered or dis-
penaed by the practitioner shall be maintained sepa-
rately from all other records of the pharmacy or prac-
tice. 
(6) All records relating to Schedules ID, IV and V 
controlled substances received, purchased, adminis-
tered or dispensed by the practitioner shall be main-
tained separately from all other records of the phar-
macy or practice. 
R1M-37-1L Restrictions Upon the Prescription, 
Dispensing and Administration of Controlled 
(1) A practitioner may prescribe or administer the 
Schedule II controlled substance cocaine hydrochlo-
ride only aa a topical anesthetic for mucous mem-
branes in surgical situations in which it is properly 
indicated and as local anesthetic for the repair of fo-
cial ywd pediatric lacerations when the controlled 
snhatsnco is mixed and dispensed by a registered 
pharmacist in the proper formulation and dosage. 
(2) A practitioner shall not prescribe or administer 
a controlled substance without taking into account 
the drug's potential for abuse, the possibility the drug 
may lead to dependence, the possibility the patient 
will obtain the drug for a nontherapeutic use or to 
distribute to others, and the possibility of sn illicit 
' market for the drug. 
(3) When writing a prescription for a controlled 
substance, each prescription shall contain only one 
controlled substance per prescription form and no 
other legend drug or prescription item shall be in-
cluded on that form. 
(4) A prescription for s Schedule II controlled sub-
. stance shall not be written for a quantity greater 
than medically neceasary and in no ease in quantities 
greater than a 30-day supply. 
(5) If a practitioner foils to document his intentions 
relative to refills of controlled mhstancoa in Sched-
ules m through V on a preemption form, it shall 
mean no refills are authorised. No refill is permitted 
on a prescription for a Schedule II controlled sub-
(6) Refills of controlled substance prescriptions 
shall be permitted for the period from the original 
date of the prescription as follows: 
TABLE 
l IV 
(7) No refill may be dispensed until such time has 
passed since the date of the last dispensing that 30% 
of the medication in the previous dispensing should 
have been consumed if taken according to the pre-
seriben instruction. 
(8) No prescription for a controlled snhstence shall 
be leaned or dispensed without specific inetructions 
from the preseriber on how and when the drag ia to be 
used. 
(9) Refills after expiration of the original prescrip-
tion term requires the issuance of a new prescription 
by the preecribing practitioner. 
(10) Each preecription for a controlled substance 
and the number of refills authorised shall be docu-
mented to the patient records by the pieecrib^ 
titioner. 
(ID A pnctitiooer shall not prescribe, dispense or 
adrninistoT a ScftodnUn controlled st i t^ 
poses of weight reduction or control. 
(12) A practitioner shall not prescribe or administer 
a Schedule II controlled stimulant for any purpose 
except: 
(a) the treatment of narcolepsy aa confirmed by neu-
rological evaluation; 
(b) the treatment of abnormal behavioral syndrome 
(attention deficit disorder, hyperkinetic syndrome), 
and/or related disorders; 
(e) the treatment of drag-induced brain oysrunction; 
(d) the differential diagnostic psychiatric evaluation 
of depression; 
(e) the treatment of depression shown to be refrac-
tory to other therapeutic modalities, including phar-
macologic epproachea, such as tricyclic antidepres-
sants or MAO inhibitors; 
(0 in the terminal stages of disease, aa adjunctive 
therapy in the treatment of chronic severe pain or 
chronic severe pain accompanied by oppression; 
(g) the clinical investigation of the effects of such 
drugs, in which esse the practitioner shall submit to 
the division a written Investigative protocol for its 
review and approval before the investigation has 
begun. The investigation shall be conducted in strict 
compliance with the investigative protocol, and the 
practitioner shall, within sixty days following the 
conclusion of the investigation, submit to the division 
a written report detailing the findings and conclu-
sions of the investigation; or 
(h) in treatment of depression associated with medi-
cal illness after due consideration of other therapeu-
tic modalitiee. 
(13) A practitioner may prescribe, dispense or ad-
minister a Schedule II controlled stimulant when 
properly indicated for any purpose listed in para-
graph (12) of this rule, provided that all of the follow-
ing conditions are met 
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(a) before initiating treatment utilizing a Schedule 
0 controlled stimulant the practitioner obtain* an 
appropriate history and physical examination, and 
rules out the existence of any recognized contraindi-
cations to the use of the controlled substance to be 
utilized; 
(b) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or 
administer any Schedule II controlled stimulant 
when he knows or has reason to believe that a recog-
nized contraindication to its use exists; 
(c) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or 
administer any Schedule II controlled stimulant in 
the treatment of a patient who he knows or should 
know is pregnant; and 
(d) the practitioner shall not initiate or shall discon-
tinue prescribing, dispensing or administering ail 
Schedule II controlled stimulants immediately upon 
ascertaining or having reason to believe that the pa-
tient has consumed or disposed of any controlled 
stimulant other than in compliance with the treating 
practitioner's directions. 
(14) A prescribing practitioner may prescribe, dis-
pense or administer a Schedule III or IV controlled 
substance for purposes of weight reduction in the 
treatment of obesity only as an adjunct in accordance 
with the FDA. approved labeling for the product, in 
a medically supervised program of weight reduction 
based on calorie restriction, provided that all of the 
following conditions are met: 
(a) before initiating treatment utilizing a Schedule 
III or IV controlled substance, the prescribing practi-
tioner determines through review of his own records 
of prior treatment, or through review of the records of 
prior treatment which another treating prescribing 
practitioner or weight-foes program has provided to 
the prescribing practitioner, that the patient has 
made a substantial good-frith effort to lose weight in 
a treatment program utilizing a regimen of weight 
reduction based on caloric restriction, nutritional 
counseling, behavior modification, and exercise, with-
out the utilization of controlled substances, and that 
said treatment has been ineffective; 
(b) before initiating treatment utilizing a Schedule 
HI or IV controlled substance, the prescribing practi-
tioner obtains a thorough history, performs a thor-
ough physical examination of the patient, and rules 
out the existence of any recognized contxsindications 
to the use of the controlled substance to be utilized; 
(c) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or 
administer any Schedule m or IV controlled sub-
stance when he knows or has reason to believe that a 
recognized contraindication to its use exists; 
-(d) this practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or 
administer Schedule III or IV controlled substances 
for weight reduction for a period longer man twelve 
weeks in any one-year period. The one year period 
shall begin counting the first day of.the drug therapy 
aa indicated on the preecriber instructions for -use; 
(e) the practitioner shall not prescribe, dispense or 
administer any Schedule III or IV controlled sub-
stance in the treatment of a patient who he knows or 
should know is pregnant; and 
(f) the practitioner shall not initiate or shall discon-
tinue prescribing, dispensing or administering all 
Schedule m or IV controlled substances for weight 
reduction immediately upon ascertaining or having 
reason to believe: 
(i) that the patient has failed to lose weight while 
under treatment with a controlled substance or con-
trolled substances over a period of 28 days, which 
determination shall be made by a scheduled weighing 
of the patient at least every fourteenth day, except 
that a patient who has never before received tr^H 
ment for obesity utilizing any controlled subeta^fl 
who foils to loee weight during his first i u c h t £ 9 
ment attempt may be treated with a differentSB 
trolled substance for an additional fourteen dajaS 
(ii) that the patient has developed tolerance ( a ^ B 
creasing contribution of the drug toward fatfcafl 
weight loss) to the anorectic effects of the centreing 
substance being utilized; . j ^ l l 
Oil) that the patient has a history of drug abuseiS 
shows a propensity for alcohol abuse; or _ J | 
(iv) that the patient has consumed or disposed-sq 
any controlled substance other than in «mtpniijfin 
with the prescribing practitioners directions. ~\M 
R156-37-12. Emergency Verbal Prescription. Sfj 
Schedule II Controlled Substances. . -'3J 
(1) Prescribing practitioners may give a verbal prtn 
scription for a Schedule II controlled substance i£ j 
(a) the quantity dispensed is only sufficient to coverl 
the patient for the emergency period, not to exceed 72J 
hours; ."""J 
(b) the prescribing practitioner has rrsmined the: 
patient within the past 30 days, the patient is under: 
the continuing care of the prescribing practitioner for 
a chronic disease or ailment or the prescribing pree-" 
titioner is covering for another practitioner and has 
knowledge of the patient's condition; snd 
(c) a written prescription is delivered to the phar-
macist within three working days of the verbal order. 
(2) A pharmacist may fill an emergency verbal or 
telephonic prescription from a prescribing practi-
tioner for a Schedule II controlled substance ic 
(a) the amount does not exceed a 72 hour supply; 
and 
(b) the filling pharmacist reasonably believes that 
the prescribing practitioner is licensed to prescribe 
the controlled snhstanfen or makes a reasonable ef-
fort to determine that he is Ucensed. 
R156-3743. Disposal of Controlled Substances. 
(1) Any disposal of controlled substances by li-
censees shall: 
(a) be consistent with the provisions of 1307.21 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations; or 
(b) require the authorization of the diviaion after 
submission to the division (Attention: Chief Investi-
gator) of a detailed listing of the controlled sub-" 
stances and the quantity of each. Disposal shall be 
conducted in the presence of one of its investigators or 
a division authorized agent aa is specifically in-
structed by the division in its written authorization. 
(2) Records of disposal of controlled substances 
shall be ***in*mi**A tad made available on request to 
the division or its agents for inspection for a period of 
five years. 
R156-37-14. Surrender of Suspended or Revoked 
' license. 
(1) Licenses which have been restricted, suspended 
or revoked shall be surrendered to the division within 
30 days of the effective date of the order of restriction, 
suspension or revocation. Compliance with this sec-
tion will be a consideration in evaluating applications 
for reUcensing. 
R1M-37-15. Herbal Products. 
The division shall not apply the provisions of the 
Controlled Substance Act or these rules in restricting 
citizens or practitioners, regardless of their license 
status, from the sale or use of food or herbal products 
that are not scheduled as controlled substances by 
State or Federal law. 
